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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Purpose of Research 
The freedom to provide cross-border services plays a significant role within the European in-
ternal market. The service sector represents about 70% of our GDP on average and will likely 
provide most job opportunities over the next decade.1 Especially now, as Europe faces hard 
questions during the ongoing economic crisis, a vibrant service sector could provide answers 
to growth and help us avoid perpetual decline. This potential can only be exploited to its full-
est extent if Europe can overcome fragmentation that blocks the flow of content and restricts 
consumer access.2 However, a market that operates without borders can be difficult to accept 
as there are social expectations that are intertwined with national history and culture. Govern-
ments feel that in certain instances vital public interests must be prioritized, because laws are 
not effective unless they reflect the collective morality of society and provide a deterrent to 
domestic and foreign threats.  
Restricting the free movement of services on the basis of these legitimate interests is what this 
thesis concentrates on. The main focus of this paper will be on three specific exceptions to the 
free movement of services; public policy, public security and public interest. To fully under-
stand the scope of these three justifications, they will be examined from two different angles. 
Firstly, I will present the express powers given to the Member States by Union law to restrict 
or prevent the fundamental freedom to provide and receive services. Secondly, I will examine 
the ‘overriding reasons in the public interest’; a doctrine developed by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union.  
The main focus of this paper will be on the activist approach of the Court as it has tried to de-
fine what the margin of discretion is when Member States enact barriers in order protect im-
portant national interests. It is unsurprising that this balancing act has caused friction. There is 
                                                 
1 ETLA (Research Institute of the Finnish Economy): New value from services 2012, p.10. 
2 Hatzopoulos 2012, p. VIII 
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often a perception that the Court tends to indulge in excessive activism3 and goes beyond its 
judicial capacity while safeguarding the services market from restrictions. The task of trying to 
find a balanced approach is especially daunting in the case of public policy, public security or 
public interest. While the European Court of Justice is supposed to draw inspiration from our 
common constitutional tradition, the reality is that value systems tend to vary when borders 
are crossed and public policy/security/interest related questions are often entrenched in na-
tional history. The inviolability of human dignity might be a legitimate reason to restrict vio-
lence in entertainment in one country, but it can also be an unjustified barrier to fundamental 
economic freedoms in another.   
As a result, the Court has tried to adopt a somewhat cautious approach while maintaining the 
goal of liberalization. For example, in the famous Grogan case the Court put aside moral ar-
guments when it concluded that abortion procedures were medical services, even though out-
lawed in Ireland, while also ruling that the Irish prohibition fell outside the scope of Commu-
nity law.4 The judgment was criticized by both sides and raised questions whether the CJEU 
was dancing around the rules in order to avoid political backlash. My aim is to explore if the 
CJEU has, in fact, muddied the waters with its rulings.  
The concept of public policy, or ordre public, is well known in international law so a lot of 
literature has been published on the issue from various perspectives. However, there is no 
meaningful way to comprehensively explain what the concept of public policy, public security 
or public interest is per se, because every society has a different take. 5 Therefore, my primary 
objective in this thesis is to find out if there is some specific formula that tells us how Member 
States have to act in order to satisfy the Court. What are the objective requirements when na-
                                                 
3 The sentiment behind judicial activism is that decision-making is being transferred from legislature 
to the courts as judges make crucial policy decisions.  
4 Case C-159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685, para 21 and 24. 
5 For example, the Supreme Administrative Court in Finland (case 2007:47) referenced to government 
proposal 28/2003vp when examining the concept of public policy and security. It was stated that the 
concept of public policy and security are applied differently in every country. When applied broadly, 
they can include all things related to providing a secure and an enjoyable environment to citizens.  
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tional measures are adopted in order to restrict the free movement of services? Is there a clear 
test of justification or are Member States at the mercy of the whims of the Court?  
1.2 Structure  
I will start this thesis, and the second chapter, by going through the provisions governing the 
free movement of services as they are laid out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the Europe-
an Union (TFEU). Going through the legal framework is necessary as it provides a foundation 
for understanding the judgments of the Court. In the third and fourth chapter, I will identify 
and examine different justifications recognized by EU law: Article 52 TFEU (public policy 
and security) and the judge-made ‘overriding reasons in the public interest’ doctrine. The em-
phasis will be on the case law of the CJEU, because the Treaty provisions are rather vague and 
open to interpretation. The Court is often seen as a political animal, as a chameleon that adapts 
to its environment, and my aim is to analyze its judgments with a healthy dose of criticism. 
Even though the CJEU can be somewhat ambiguous at times, I will do my best at identifying 
the significance of those judgments so that we can better understand how the free movement 
of services can be restricted on the grounds of public policy, security or interest.   
Towards the end of this paper, in the fifth chapter, I will investigate the relationship between 
the express derogations, such as public policy and security, and the judge-made exceptions 
(ORPI). The existence of a legitimate interest does not mean that the Court will customarily 
give its blessing to the national measure in question. My intention is to find out if there are 
some inherent differences concerning how the different justifications function - when Member 
States invoke them as they adopt restrictive measures.  
This paper will conclude with a discussion in chapter six.  
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2. THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES  
2.1 Single Market Persistently on the Horizon 
Market integration is one of the main aims of the European project. Article 26 (2) of the TFEU 
states that the internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers, in which the 
free movement of services is ensured, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties. While 
the Treaty of Rome originally set out the concept of a common market back in 1958, the 
post-war focus was undoubtedly on the recovery of the manufacturing sector. The services 
sector played a minor part even in the 1980s when the likes of Jacques Delors, president of the 
European Commission, and British Commissioner Lord Cockfield devised a route towards 
increased co-operation and removal of physical, technical and fiscal barriers to trade.6 
Three decades later, the process of integration is still very much ongoing as Europe tries to 
find ways to abolish barriers and enhance competitiveness within the services market. The 
latest effort to promote smart and sustainable economic growth in Europe is called the Europe 
2020 strategy which was launched in 2010.7 Improving competitiveness is seen as a key 
component in responding to the current economic troubles that still haunt the continent after 
the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. While the Economic Recovery Plan and the Stabilization 
Mechanisms served to mitigate the immediate risk of contagion across the European Union, 
the 2020 strategy operates as a medium term plan for the Member States. Five years after its 
launch, the quality of structural reforms varies from one country to another, but there is an 
overwhelming support for a comprehensive strategy in favor of growth.8  
As the trade in services has eventually grown, there have been an increasing amount of cases 
that the European Court of Justice has had to settle as well. The development of case law has 
expanded over the years, outlining how the general Treaty provisions should be applied in 
                                                 
6 Barnard 2013, p.10 and COM (85) 310 “Completing the internal market”.  
7 COM (2010) 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.   
8 COM (2015) 100. Results of the public consultation on the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustaina-
ble and inclusive growth.  
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specific cross-border situations.  Legislative action has also taken place during the past dec-
ade. The European Union and the Member States have worked with the implementation of the 
Services Directive.9 The need for further integration is clearly recognized and, according to 
Commission estimates, a more thorough implementation of the Services Directive could pro-
vide additional economic gain to the tune of 2.6% GDP. Many Member States such as Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and the Czech Republic are carrying out reforms as they aim for economic 
growth. 10 Others are more reluctant to accept cross-border liberalization, often citing con-
sumer protection and the environment as reasons for their careful approach.    
This thesis will examine next how the EU law in the field of services is structured and what 
the free movement of services entails. The application of articles 56-62 TFEU (formerly 49-55 
EC) has often been controversial. The Member States and the European Court have repeatedly 
been on a collision course while this freedom has developed, and later on I will demonstrate 
how governments have tried to justify their restrictions. This second chapter will conclude 
with the presentation of the Services Directive and other sectoral legislation. The Services 
Directive is an important instrument that covers a wide range of economic activity.  
2.2 General Scope of the Free Movement of Services 
The freedom to provide services entails the pursuit of an economic activity for a temporary 
period in any Member State in which either the provider, the recipient or the service is not 
established.11 Article 56 TFEU provides:  
“Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to provide ser-
vices within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are 
established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intend-
ed”  
                                                 
9 COM (2012) 261 on the implementation of the Services Directive “A partnership for new growth in 
services 2012-2015”. 
10 Commission contribution to the European Council of 20-21.3.2014. ” Services: Tapping the poten-
tial for growth and jobs”, p.3. 
11 Paul 2011, p.788.  
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This rather complicated passage can be split into smaller pieces so that we can better under-
stand what it encompasses. Firstly, we can see that this right applies only to nationals who are 
established in a Member State. In case of companies, legal persons, the General Programme 
on Services states that this requirement is satisfied when the company has a real and continu-
ous link with the economy of the Member State.12 This is relevant in situations where the 
company has a registered office inside the European Union while the management resides 
somewhere else.13  
Secondly, we can see that Article 56 paints a picture where the service provider is established 
in one Member State while providing services on a temporary basis in another Member State. 
One example might be a Finnish company that provides household shifting services for 
wealthy individuals who decide to relocate to Cannes. Article 56 can be used to challenge 
rules enacted by both the home (in our example Finland) or the host state (France) if they re-
strict the freedom to provide or receive services.14 The right to move freely is also not re-
stricted to just service providers. The Court has stated that the freedom to receive services is 
the necessary corollary and it is only logical that the recipient should also be able to travel to 
the state of the provider in order to receive services. Not only that, the Court has also con-
cluded that Article 56 applies in situations where neither the provider nor the recipient travel 
but only the service itself moves. The Court has concluded that situations where the provider 
is offering services via technical devices are covered by the Treaty.15 Applying Union law to 
services themselves is important as it facilitates the implementation of modern technology in 
cross-border transactions. For example, the internet has expanded the market horizon to sub-
scription based business models such as Facebook and Netflix.  
                                                 
12  General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services. OJ 002, 
15/01/1962 English special edition: Series II Volume IX. 
13 Wyatt 2011, p.554.  
14 In Gourmet, the European Court of Justice ruled that national measures obstructing cross-border 
advertisement can be challenged and are in violation of Article 56 TFEU but may be justified by public 
interest requirements (public health). Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001] ECR I-1795, para 39 and 40.  
15 Barnard 2013, p.368; Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141. 
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Finally, the Court has given some consideration to situations that could be considered mainly 
internal. In Carpenter, a national of the Philippines, challenged British immigration rules as 
her deportation would have been detrimental to her husband’s ability to provide services.16 As 
a result, the principle that Union law only covers cross-border situations in the field of services 
can be somewhat inconclusive at times.  
2.2.1 The Temporary Nature of Services and Need for Remuneration 
We have established that Article 56 TFEU is usually confined to three basic cross-border situ-
ations where the provider, recipient or service itself moves. Now it is time to find out what 
constitutes a service in EU law. Article 57 states the following:  
“Services shall be considered to be services…where they are normally provided for remunera-
tion, in so far as they are not governed by provisions relating to freedom of movement for 
goods, capital and persons.” 
The text suggests that this provision is subordinate to other fundamental freedoms as services 
are services only when the other Treaty provisions related to goods, capital and persons do not 
apply.17 While some examples are provided by the Treaty,18 compiling a comprehensive and 
detailed list of all services is not feasible as the sector is rapidly changing and developing. 
However, we can see from the text that there is a need for an economic link. The Court has 
used this principle to exclude voluntary activities from the scope of the Treaty. This was the 
case in the highly contentious Grogan ruling, where the Court evaluated whether providing 
information about the availability of abortion services in another Member State was protected 
by Article 56 TFEU. Student unions in Ireland were responsible for distributing information 
about the availability of legal abortions in the UK and the argument was that restricting the 
activity would constitute an obstacle to the freedom to provide services. The Court ruled 
                                                 
16 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279.  
17 Case C-180/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-709, para 6; Davies 2003, p.75. 
18 Activities of industrial and commercial character are mentioned in Article 57 TFEU. Similarly, the 
activities of craftsmen and the professions are covered by the Treaty. However, in secondary legisla-
tion the approach can be somewhat opposite. For instance, the Services Directive states specifically 
what activities are excluded.  
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eventually that Union law did not apply, because the information was not given directly on 
behalf of the economic operator (abortion clinics) and thus no direct economic link existed.19 
The approach was careful but also much criticized. A full collision between fundamental eco-
nomic rights and the Irish constitution20 was avoided but it raised questions. Would the out-
come have been different if the abortion clinics had given any compensation to the students’ 
unions?   
The absence of remuneration has caused some headache also in the case of public services, as 
the recipient might not pay anything directly for state funded programs. In Humbel, the Court 
concluded that state education was not covered by the Treaty provisions as the purpose of the 
state was not to gain profit but instead fulfill its cultural and social duties to its population.21 
However, the Court disagreed later when Member States relied on Humbel and argued that 
publicly funded healthcare did not constitute an economic activity. In Watts the Court con-
cluded that Article 56 applies to healthcare systems even when patients are covered directly 
and the system is paid via general taxation.22 It remains to be seen how the Court will apply its 
case law as some Member States lean towards a freer market approach when providing essen-
tial services to the public. At what point does state funded education cross the threshold where 
Humbel ends and Watss begins? Despite these slight inconsistencies, the need for remunera-
tion operates as the baseline.        
We now understand some aspects of EU law in the field of services, but it is important to dis-
tinguish services from the concept of establishment, which is governed by Articles 49-55. 
Here we arrive to the temporary nature of services: The provisions related to the freedom of 
establishment apply when a Polish plumber relocates to France and offers valve assemblies on 
a permanent basis. But should he travel to Sweden, for temporary repair work, he is most 
likely providing a service.23 The line can be somewhat blurry at times but the Court stated in 
                                                 
19 Case C-159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685, para 24. 
20 Abortion is still illegal in Ireland. However, the new Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 
provides that termination is allowed to protect the life of the mother.  
21 Case C-263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365. 
22 Case C-374/04 Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust [2006] ECR I-4325; Barnard 2013, p.377. 
23 Wyatt 2011, p.556-557. 
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Gebhard that the question of time should not be simply based on the duration of the activity 
but also on its regularity, periodicity or continuity.24 In Schnitzer, a Portuguese firm agreed to 
carry out large-scale plastering work in Germany between the years 1994 and 1997. The Court 
said that the Treaty does not provide any formula for determining the duration beyond which 
the activity should only be governed by provisions related to freedom of establishment.25 Re-
garding the Portuguese firm, the Court felt that three years was not too long and the service 
provisions would apply.  
In Trojani, the Court affirmed that activities carried out on a permanent basis, or at least 
without a foreseeable time limit, would not fall within the Community provisions concerning 
services.26 That being said, the Court has held that despite the temporary nature of the activity, 
the person providing the service may equip himself with some form of infrastructure in the 
host Member State when necessary – such as offices or consulting rooms.27 A place of busi-
ness in another state, even when it exists for many years, does not necessarily mean that the 
activity is not protected by EU services law (long lasting construction work for example).  
The freedom of services and establishment share many similarities and one should be careful 
before making quick distinctions. In the first instance, national courts are responsible for in-
terpreting the difference, which is handled on a case-by-case basis. However, one difference 
between the two relates to the possible requirements that the host state may necessitate. Indi-
viduals or companies that are established in another Member State can be expected to observe 
national rules. On the other hand, it is not as easy to accept that service providers should be 
required to comply with every regulation that exists in the host state while they operate in a 
cross-border environment on a temporary basis. If that were the case, single market in the field 
of services would be practically unattainable. This is the approach Advocate General Jacobs 
took in Säger28 and the Court has shared this sentiment in its subsequent case law.29 The result 
                                                 
24 Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, para 27. 
25 Case C-215/01 Schnitzer [2003] ECR I-14847. 
26 Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, para 28. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221. Opinion of AG Jacobs, 21 February 1991, para 23. 
29 Case C-198/89 Commission v. Greece [1991] ECR I-727, para 16. 
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is somewhat similar to the principle of Mutual Recognition; a fundamental part of the free 
movement of goods. Mutual Recognition operates under the presumption that legally produced 
goods can be sold equally in all other member States without having to constantly comply 
with different regulations when crossing borders.30   
2.2.2 Direct Effect  
One of the fundamental characteristics of the European Union is that its law is usually en-
forced in a decentralized manner through domestic courts. Through the principle of direct ef-
fect, or immediate applicability, Union law is capable of producing independent effects within 
national judicial systems.31 This means that individuals may invoke European provisions even 
if no national law exists as long as the provisions are clear and unconditional.32 The direct 
effect of European law was established in 1963 when the Court of Justice gave its historic 
judgment in Van Gend & Loos.33  
In the field of services, the Court affirmed in Van Binsbergen that Articles 56 and 57 TFEU 
entailed similar effects. A Dutch national Kortmann, who lived in Belgium, challenged a rule 
that required legal representatives to be established in the Netherlands before they could rep-
resent clients in local courts. The Court ruled that, in principle, the national rule breached Ar-
ticle 56 and individuals should be able to rely on the Treaty provisions before national courts, 
at least so far as they seek to abolish any discrimination based on the nationality or locality of 
the service provider.34  
While it is unequivocally clear that Member States are not allowed to breach the Treaty provi-
sions, the question of direct effect is more complicated when we analyze restrictive measures 
adopted by private parties. Articles 60 and 61 TFEU impose obligations solely on the Member 
States and the language in 56 TFEU does not provide clarity as to how horizontal relationships 
                                                 
30 Raitio 2013, p.36.  
31 Wyatt 2011, p.235 and Jacobs 2007, p.39–40. 
32 Hartley 2010, p.210. 
33 Case 26/62 van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
34 Case 33/74 van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299, para 27; Broberg 2003, p.780. 
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are covered.35 However, the Court has outlined certain situations in its case law where private 
parties may be caught by the free movement provisions. For example, this is the case if the 
private conduct hinders the free movement of services and the state fails to adopt adequate 
measures to fulfill its Community obligations and deal with the situation properly.36 Private 
parties may also be subject to Treaty provisions when there is a national measure that is de-
signed to regulate gainful employment and the provision of services in a collective manner.37  
The Court has repeatedly stated that the notion of a Single Market would be compromised if 
obstacles resulting from private activity could neutralize the abolition of state barriers.38 The 
argument is sound if we consider a situation, where a local service provider is acting aggres-
sively towards his/her out of state counterpart, and the state is reluctant to intervene on behalf 
of the foreign service providers. One should not only consider the superficial appearance of 
national rules. Obstacles can take many forms when they prevent service providers from 
moving freely in the market place.  
2.3 Prohibited Discriminatory Measures 
We have previously examined some of the central principles that govern cross-border activi-
ties in the field of services. Service providers enjoy protection under the Treaty provisions as 
they complete transactions in the host country. They can expect to receive similar treatment as 
their in-state equivalents. This non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality is the funda-
mental basis for all economic freedoms within the European Union’s internal market.39 It can 
be seen in Article 57(2) TFEU and Article 18 TFEU also states that any discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.  
                                                 
35 Horizontal direct effect is consequential in relations between private actors whereas vertical direct 
effect operates between private actors and the state. See Raitio 2013, p.262.  
36 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, para 22.  
37 Case C-191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549, para 47 “The abolition as between Member States of 
obstacles to freedom to provide services would be compromised if the abolition of States barriers could 
be neutralized by obstacles resulting from the exercise, by associations or organizations not governed 
by public law, of their legal autonomy”.  
38 Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, para 120. 
39 Barnard 2013, p.17; Raitio 2013, p.591; Broberg 2003, p.778–779. 
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However, non-discrimination does not entail that Member States lose their regulatory auton-
omy. National measures can be used to regulate the service market on condition that rules ap-
ply equally to all economic operators. In essence, discriminatory elements should be abolished 
under Union law while genuinely non-discriminatory rules are mainly lawful.40 For example, 
a Finnish rule that sets language requirements for all services originating in Sweden, while 
allowing domestic operators to continue uninhibited, would be discriminatory. In this instance 
Finland should decide whether it wants to impose language requirements on everyone or none 
at all. The Treaty does not establish any specific level at which standards should be set.41  
Before examining restrictive measures in more detail, it is worth noting that in recent years the 
Court has developed a more comprehensive approach and has applied Article 56 TFEU when 
national measures, even though non-discriminatory, have been prone to impede the free 
movement of services.42 In our example, excessive language requirements could therefore be 
in breach of the Treaty even when applied equally. There is no clear formula for understanding 
what the proportional approach is, because every national law that regulates the domestic 
market can serve as a hindrance in some manner. Ultimately, the responsibility lies with the 
CJEU and even then the judgments can be somewhat inconclusive.        
2.3.1 Distinctly Applicable Measures 
The principle of direct discrimination, or distinctly applicable measures, was laid out in Gou-
da. The Court declared that Article 56 TFEU prohibits restrictive regulations on the grounds 
of nationality and place of establishment.43 Likewise, in Commission v. Greece, the Court held 
that requiring foreign tourist guides to possess specific qualifications issued out by the host 
state (Greece) would be incompatible with Article 56 unless such measures could be objec-
tively justified.44 Another example was the FDC case: Spanish law granted licenses to dub 
                                                 
40 Barnard 2013, p.17 
41 Ibid, p.18. 
42 Paul 2011, p.808. 
43 Case C-288/89 Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007 “Article [56 TFEU] entails, in the first place, the aboli-
tion of any discrimination against a person providing services on the ground of his nationality or the 
fact that he is established in a Member State other than the one in which the service is provided”.  
44 Case C-198/89 Commission v. Greece [1991] ECR I-727 para 18.  
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foreign films on condition that distributors would also put Spanish films into circulation sim-
ultaneously. The Court held that the national rule gave preferential treatment to local film 
producers and was therefore in breach of the Treaty.45 
The CJEU has repeatedly stated that direct discrimination on grounds of nationality or place of 
establishment can only be allowed if the Member State successfully references to one of the 
express derogations such as public policy and public security in Article 52 TFEU.46 The case 
law suggests that there is some ambiguity around this issue, but in Commission v. Poland the 
Court reaffirmed its position as far as direct discrimination is considered.47 It is possible that 
the Court is not necessarily changing the narrative as time passes but instead carefully exam-
ines justifications on a case-by-case basis then applies the law appropriately.  
2.3.2 Indistinctly Applicable Measures 
The Court has established that indirect discrimination, or indistinctly applicable measures, are 
also prohibited under the Treaty provisions. This involves situations where national measures 
appear to be neutral on their face but in practice have the same result as outright preferential 
treatment. ‘Same burden in law while different burden in fact’ is often the expression used to 
describe such situations.48 One such example was the insurance case Commission v. Germany 
in which the court stated that German rules were in breach of the Treaty, because requiring 
insurance companies to be established and authorized in Germany severely increased costs - 
especially in situations where the insurer only performed transactions occasionally.49  
Indirect discrimination is often hard to spot, but distinctions made on the basis of language or 
licenses have been considered as indistinctly applicable by the Court.50 In Gullung and Vlas-
                                                 
45 Case C-17/92 FDC [1993] ECR I-2239, para 15. 
46 Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-987, para 116-117; Case C-490/04 Commission v. Germany 
[2007] ECR I-6095, para 86; See also Barnard 2013, p.383.  
47 Case C-546/07 [2010] ECR I-439, para 47.  
48 Barnard 2013, p.247.  
49 Case 205/84 Commission v. Germany [1986] ECR 3755 
50 Wiberg 2014, p.111. 
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sopolou the Court stated that licensing requirements can be indirectly discriminatory when a 
dual burden is imposed on foreign individuals without objective justifications.51  
Simply put, migrants suffer as they have to satisfy their home-state rules and later also the 
rules of the host-state.52  
In Commission v. UK, the national rules required that non-residents could only constitute 25% 
of the crew on fishing vessels in British waters. The Court saw this as indirectly discriminato-
ry and therefore Article 56 TFEU was violated.53 These examples seem to suggest that, while 
discriminatory measures based on nationality or establishment are direct, different treatment 
on the basis of residence can sometimes be considered as indirectly discriminatory. However, 
regardless of the form that discrimination takes, the Court has established in its case law that 
Article 56 TFEU “prohibits not overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all cov-
ert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in 
fact to the same result” (see fig.1).54 We can therefore reiterate that the Court tends to empha-
size consequences of the measure while formal questions are usually of secondary importance.  
2.3.3 Non-discriminatory Measures and Market Access 
 
The European Court of Justice used to view genuinely non-discriminatory measures as ac-
ceptable.55 This approach has changed since and now national rules that impede or prevent the 
free movement of services can be in breach of the Treaty even when applied without distinc-
tion. It was in Säger, where the Court stated that Article 56 TFEU requires “not only the elim-
ination of all discrimination against a person providing services on the grounds of his nation-
ality, but also the abolition of any restriction even if it applies without distinction to national 
                                                 
51 Case 292/86 Gullung [1988] ECR 111; Case 340/89 Vlassopoulou [1991] ECR I-2357.  
52 Case C-288/89 Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007 para 12: “restrictions…may arise…as a result of the ap-
plication of national rules which affect any person established in the national territory to persons 
providing services established in the territory of another Member State who already have to satisfy the 
requirements of that State’s legislation”.   
53 Wiberg 2014, p.111; Case 279/89 Commission v UK [1992] ECR I-5785. 
54 Case C-388/01 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-721. 
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providers of services”.56 Also, in Alpine Investments the Court declared that measures hinder-
ing intra-union trade in services and impeding access to the markets would constitute a viola-
tion of the Treaty.57 A wide variety of national rules have been under consideration. For ex-
ample, in Placanica, the Court ruled that an Italian rule prohibiting activities in the gambling 
market without a license was within the scope of the Treaty. 58  Likewise, advertising re-
strictions have been considered to have a particular effect as was the case in Gourmet.59   
The market access test provides a useful tool for removing excessive barriers, but there is also 
a danger that it can create confusion if applied broadly. After all, most regulations tend to be 
bothersome and incur costs. Striking down genuinely non-discriminatory rules adopted by 
democratically elected governments can have serious political ramifications.60 While Member 
States can always use the Treaty exceptions and public interest requirements to justify their 
measures, the Court would do well to apply a cautious approach in this regard.   
Fig.1 
                                                                                                                                                         
55 Case 52/79 Debauve [1981] ECR 833:” If rules are applied without distinction as regards the 
origin, whether national or foreign, of those advertisements, the nationality of the person providing the 
services, or the place where he is established”; See also Barnard 2013, p.385. 
56 Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, para 12; See also Barnard 2013, p.386; Wyatt 2011, p.565.  
57 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141: Prohibition of cold-calling under Dutch law 
was therefore within the scope of Article 56 TFEU but the Court also accepted that the ban was justi-
fied on the basis of safeguarding the integrity of the market environment.     
58 Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 Placanica [2007] ECR I-1891, para 42 and 44.  
59 Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001] ECR I-1795, para 39.  
60 Barnard 2013, p.17-20. 
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2.4 Secondary Legislation  
2.4.1 The Services Directive  
In order to promote economic growth in the field of services, the Lisbon Council invited the 
European Commission to propose a new plan for the purpose of removing national barriers 
from the internal market. This was accomplished in 2000 and eventually led to the enactment 
of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the 
internal market.61 It is the most significant piece of secondary legislation to date, in the field 
of services, and one of its main aims was to build on the solid foundation of previous case law. 
The Directive covers economic activities to the tune of 46% EU GDP and, according to Com-
mission estimates, gains up to 1.6% of EU GDP (140 billion €) could be realized if Member 
States can agree on further liberalization. The potential is significant even though specific 
sectors were excluded from the final text as a compromise. 62 For example, broadcasting, legal 
and postal services and public transportation were a concern as Member States wanted to 
safeguard national markets from disturbances.63 In addition, the final version of the Services 
Directive was founded on host-state control; meaning that national restrictions are lawful un-
less successfully challenged. Essentially, the country-of-origin principle was removed from 
the final draft.64  
The Directive operates as a general legal framework and applies to a wide variety of services 
while also taking into account the distinctive features of different regulatory systems. The in-
tent of this framework is to remove barriers by launching a process of evaluation of existing 
obstacles and from there make it possible to modernize national regulatory systems for service 
activities by means of harmonization and administrative simplification.65 The Directive obli-
gates Member States to establish a point of single contact (PSC). Providers and recipients of 
                                                 
61 COM (2000) 888 final, p.2 and Wiberg 2014, p.3. The process itself can be traced back to as early as 
1997 when the Commission presented an Action Plan for the Single market. 
62 European Commission, EU Services Brochure (2014).  
63 Wiberg 2014, p.204.  
64 Wiberg 2014, p.24 and p.31. The country-of-origin principle would mean that service providers 
would only have to comply with the regulations of the state of establishment.  
65 Directive 2006/123/EC, recital 7. 
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services should be able to complete all formalities – such as authorizations - through these 
PSCs and simultaneously receive necessary information from them when needed.66 Finally, 
the Directive includes provisions related to administrative cooperation. Chapter VI designates 
which state is responsible for mutual assistance in particular situations.67   
The free movement of services is regulated by Chapter IV. Member States must ensure free 
access to their territory while also enabling the free exercise of service activities inside their 
borders. Discriminatory measures are strictly prohibited and service providers should not have 
to comply with non-justified requirements in order to gain access either. A real world example 
could be a Finnish architect who works in Helsinki but also wants to provide his services in 
Belgium on a temporary basis. The Belgian authorities cannot prevent him from working in 
Brussels on the basis of his nationality. The local authorities can demand that the architect is 
properly qualified but at the same the authorities should also be able to demonstrate that such 
qualifications are in fact necessary.  
The issue of justified requirements and necessity has often been raised by various Member 
States. For example, the UK has lobbied for greater transparency over the criteria of propor-
tionality.68 The approach is reasonable if we consider the nature of Directives. They are bind-
ing legislative instruments, enacted by the institutions of the Union, but the choice and form of 
their implementation is the responsibility of national authorities. 69 As a result, interpretation 
and implementation varies from one Member State to another which can create confusion at 
times. Nevertheless, the concept of proportionality and necessity will be discussed in more 
detail when we examine the concept of ‘overriding reasons in the public interest’ in chapter 4.      
It is worth keeping in mind that the Services Directive facilitates temporary cross-border ac-
tivities. If the architect in our example decides to run a business in Brussels on a stable basis, 
his situation would probably fall under the scope of another Directive related to the Mutual 
                                                 
66 Barnard 2013 s.427 
67 Art. 29-35, Barnard 2013 p.428. 
68 Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union, p.31.  
69 Article 288 TFEU.   
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Recognition of Professional Qualifications.70  The recognition of qualifications by the host 
state means that a service provider from another state can pursue his profession, for which he 
is qualified, under the same condition as nationals. In essence, these directives regulate the 
same activity but function in different ways.    
All Member States have officially transposed the Services Directive by the end of 2012, al-
most three years after the original deadline. The delays were mostly a result of some states 
experiencing difficulties while they were modifying existing national laws and procedural 
practices in order to properly implement the Directive.71  
2.4.2 Sectoral Legislation  
While the Services Directive is the most important piece of secondary legislation, other legis-
lative acts have been adopted over the years in order to cover a range of specific sectors.72  
These include the E-commerce Directive (2000/31) which promotes the free movement of 
information services between Member States. Online newspapers are covered by the Di-
rective.  
Another example is the Audio Visual and Media Services Directive (2010/13) which regulates 
the freedom to provide television services. Member States are not allowed to restrict the re-
ception of legitimately made broadcasts in another Member State, unless specific public policy 
conditions provide exceptions.73      
We have established some ground rules as regards to the rights that service providers and re-
ceivers enjoy. It is now time to analyze the concepts of public policy and security, and then 
examine the express powers that Member States can use to restrict the aforementioned rights 
from being enjoyed in full.  
                                                 
70 Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union, p.32.  
71 Klamert 2014, p.224. 
72 ‘Financial services’ is one sector which is comprehensively regulated.  
73 The United Kingdom used Article 27 when it banned the Red Hot Dutch channel in order to protect 
the physical and mental development of minors. (Balance of Competences report, p.33).  
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3. PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC SECURITY  
“No nation can be justly required to yield up its own fundamental policy and institutions in 
favor of those of another nation. Much less can any nation be required to sacrifice its own 
interests in favor of another; or to enforce doctrines which, in a moral, or political view, are 
incompatible with its own safety or happiness, or conscientious regard to justice and duty” 
Story (1846)74 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Public Policy  
The concept of public order is well known in all modern legal systems. The French name or-
dre public most likely originated in the French Code Civil.75 The term is the equivalent of 
public policy, which is used in Anglo-American legal terminology. The reason why English 
and U.S law uses public policy as an expression instead of public order is to avoid confusion 
with the traditional concept of “law and order”.76 Regardless, these two terms “ordre public 
and public policy” are often used interchangeably when speaking about the body of principles 
that underpin national legal systems. The terms are often used as synonyms in international 
contract drafting, because technically they tend to pursue the same objective even if their exact 
meaning can vary from one country to another.77 In academic literature there is some disa-
greement regarding the possible differences between these terms but, for the purposes of this 
thesis, the terms public policy and ordre public will be used as equivalents.  
In domestic private and public law these terms express the idea of state supremacy. For exam-
ple, public policy indicates a situation in which a domestic mandatory rule and interest pre-
vails over any conflicting agreements. There can be some important reason to prevent private 
                                                 
74 Story, J. 1846. Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic. 
75 Czech 2012, p.82. Article 6 of the French Code Civil stated that “Private agreements must not con-
travene the laws which concern public order and good morals”.  
76 Ibid, p.80. 
77 Ibid, p.119. 
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parties from setting aside national provisions when they sign contracts. For instance, minors 
are not allowed to participate in online gambling as it would be against public morality. In 
international relations ordre public often appears as an objection; when countries ratify treaties 
but want to maintain some remedies in order to avoid undesirable consequences.78 One can 
make the distinction between domestic and international situations via using terms such as 
ordre public interne and ordre public externe.79 The difference is relevant as many mandatory 
domestic rules have little cross-border relevance. In any case, ordre public externe operates as 
an exception to the general rule; ergo the High Contracting Parties should not invoke it on a 
regular basis. When states do invoke these derogations, phrases such as ‘the need to protect 
our basic constitutional principles’ are often cited by local figureheads as they aim to limit the 
effect of supranational norms.   
Properly conceptualizing public policy is difficult, because it is an abstract institution. For 
example, when we speak of established principles of justice or good morals in any country, we 
must acknowledge that they are always dependent on the prevailing public opinion of that 
specific nation.80  
3.1.2 Public Interest 
The term public policy is intertwined with the concept of public interest; the well-being of 
society as a whole. This is a goal that goes beyond the aspirations and interests of an individu-
al citizen. It is by definition the mirror image of individual interest, representing a loosely de-
fined group of beneficiaries. The term public interest can be traced back to the old Roman 
Republic and the Law of the Twelve Tables (Leges Duodecim Tabularum).81 It has taken 
many forms throughout human history. For example, after the Second World War the ruling 
elite in communist countries were the sole standard-bearer of the term public interest. Earlier, 
after the fall of absolutism in the nineteenth century, public interest was adopted by liberal 
                                                 
78 Czech 2012, p.80.  
79 Ibid, p.82. 
80 Judgement of the Permanent Court of International Justice 20/21/1929, p. 46.  
81 Czech 2012, p.123. The Law of the Twelve Tables was the foundation of Roman law (c. 439 BC).   
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ideology and subjected to various reforms.82 In modern western society it can still - as is the 
case with public policy - mean anything until it is set side by side with a specific policy goal 
or some legal norm. In contemporary Europe it may refer to [a.] important environmental 
questions, [b.] local interests such as expanding the existing infrastructure or [c.] protecting 
specific groups like consumers from aggressive marketing.83  
One should be careful not to directly equate public interest with public policy for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is possible that public policy, as it represents vital state interests, differs from public 
interests and in those situations the former must prevail in order to safeguard the fundamental 
principles of the constitutional order.84 This is the position the Czech Constitutional Court 
took in 2009 when it stated that public interests can never completely remove specific funda-
mental rights from individuals.85 Also, equating public policy with public interest can be seen 
as problematic from the perspective of international co-operation, because it would essentially 
expand the public policy exception to cover a wider spectrum of interests.86  
For legal entities and natural persons, it can be problematic that there is no clear definition of 
the term; especially when local authorities decide to restrict private rights or enact barriers 
while citing that there is an imperative public interest at hand. The notion of generally benefi-
cial goals – ‘this is good for society’ – also depends on the time and location of its usage.87  
There is also the question of balance between competing policy goals. One side might believe 
that building a new factory serves the public interest while others would prefer a cleaner living 
environment.  
                                                 
82 Czech 2012, p.124.  
83 Ibid, p.121. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Constitutional Court of the Czech Rep 557/09:” Nonetheless, public interest…. may never com-
pletely prevail over the interest of the individual and strip them of their abovementioned fundamental 
rights”.  
86 Czech 2012, p.117. 
87 Czech 2012. p. 126.  
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3.1.3 Public Security  
It is often said that the most important task of human society is to safeguard its security. But 
the concept of security is constantly evolving; who should be protected and against what? In 
the fields of international relations security has often been defined exclusively in military 
terms. The reason for this is the rationalist approach towards world politics that was shaped 
largely by the Cold War. According to this vision, the world is anarchic by nature and States 
are in perpetual competition with one another. Their ultimate goal is to protect their own 
physical, political and cultural identity against any foreign intrusions. Every country is ulti-
mately responsible for guaranteeing its own survival – its security.88     
For rationalists, the nature of states is a given – they are existing entities in an environment in 
which they respond to objective threats. Following this view, the phenomenon of immigration 
can be seen as a threat to public security as it endangers the physical, political and cultural 
identity of the state. As a result, countries have to adopt strict border controls, increase sur-
veillance and rethink their asylum systems.89 The Hungarian response to the ongoing civil war 
in Syria and the European migrant crisis is a good example of traditional rationalist security 
thinking. Border transgressions are seen as a public security risk and human mobility is de-
scribed by using various threat variables: crime, cultural differences, economic stability and 
health related issues.90 
However, concentrating only on high politics and the existence of the State as the object of 
security is a narrow perspective. More and more the concept of security has been expanded to 
include everyday problems inside our society such as underdevelopment or even mundane 
traffic related issues. As the concept of security encompasses a wider spectrum, the range of 
solutions have to also increase from purely military ones.91   
                                                 
88 Brauch 2008, p.530.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Salter 2004, p.72; BBC 21.9.2015: “Our borders are under threat. Hungary is under threat and so 
is the whole of Europe” (Hungary PM Viktor Orban).  
91 Brauch 2008, p.531. 
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For the individual citizen, security can be seen as the freedom to perform something since 
there is no danger present. Human security has indeed received more attention in recent times. 
In some instances, individuals might require protection from the arbitrary power of the state; a 
situation in which the traditional concept of State security can be in conflict with the notion of 
human security.92 The Final Report of the Commission on Human Security defines the term 
individual security as protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance free-
doms and fulfilment. The goal is to create a political, social, environmental and a cultural sys-
tem that provides the necessary building blocks for humans while also protecting individuals 
from critical and pervasive threats.93 The report does not see state security and human security 
as two competing concepts, they fall under the umbrella of overall public security and com-
plement one another. The approach is logical if we consider public security issues such as hu-
man trafficking.   
It is quite evident that the concept of security is well established in our everyday language. 
However, the meaning of the term changes depending on the historical and political context 
and the strategic environment. It is a philosophical concept but also an ancient human ideal.94 
As our communities aspire towards greater security, it is easy to believe that there is an even-
tual goal where virtually all possible dangers have been removed and the citizenry can operate 
without external or internal threats. The American response to the September 11th attacks 
serves as an example of ambitious aspirations towards absolute security with little concern for 
personal liberties.95 The problem with absolute security is that even if it was possible, would it 
be preferable? There is evidence to suggest that trying to maximize public security can have 
counter-productive or even self-destructive consequences. If we accept that absolute security 
is not achievable, what would be the suitable level societies should aim for? Who decides what 
level of security is satisfactory?96  
                                                 
92 The Final Report of the Commission on Human Security 2003, p.3. 
93 Ibid, p.4.  
94 Brauch 2008, p.289. 
95 Ibid, p.108. 
96 Burgess 2008, p.6. 
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The abstract nature of security is one of the reasons why it has been used so much in academic 
literature and public discourse. Arnold Wolfers stated after the Second World War that secu-
rity is an ambiguous symbol; a concept that rarely remains stable.97 The practical reality has 
hardly changed half a century later. The elasticity of security also makes it an effective tool 
when political leaders engage in so-called risk management. In other words, a wide variety of 
policies can be justified on grounds of public security.  
3.2 On the Trail of European Public Policy   
Public policy is a stand-alone term in the context of Community acquis (EU law). It can be 
used to define the reach of all the fundamental freedoms. We have established that all modern 
nations, as is the case with all Member States of the European union, have a concept of public 
policy; both for their internal use and for protecting their constitutional principles against ex-
ternal norms.  
At the same time, these very same Member States have limited some of their sovereign rights 
via European integration and upon forming the EU.98 As a result, the European Member States 
are not in a position to autonomously define the spectrum of public policy, nor can it be de-
fined on the basis of one or even several national legal systems.99 The European Court of Jus-
tice has the authority to decide what the proper interpretation is in specific circumstances. In 
addition, since all Member States of the Union are a party to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, they must take into account the European public order as developed in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).100  
These realities do not mean that Member States are not able to independently invoke the pub-
lic policy defence in order to safeguard their own constitutional principles. The most accurate 
description would probably be that there is a constant dialogue between national courts and the 
                                                 
97 Arnold Wolfers 1962, “National Security as an ambiguous symbol”.   
98 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
99 Czech 2012, p.128.  
100 Corthaut 2012, p.30. 
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CJEU.101 While there is no federal court in the EU, national courts have the possibility to 
submit a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU when there is a question regarding the 
validity or applicability of EU law. This procedure is established in Article 267 TFEU.  
After the Court gives its decision, other courts will have to rule in accordance with the prece-
dent established by the CJEU.102 In principle, when one country invokes the public policy de-
fence and the Court disagrees, others should abide by that decision. However, this is hardly 
self-evident since traditionally the Community has not possessed a strong mechanism to force 
insubordinate courts into compliance.103 As a result, the European Court of Justice has had to 
find a way to reach agreeable compromises; to make certain that judgments are followed 
properly via paying careful attention to the acceptability and viability of the ruling. In other 
words, the CJEU has to pay proper respect to the constitutional traditions of all the 28 Member 
States. When interpreting EU law, one has to also keep in mind that Article 6(2) TEU states: 
“The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and….as they result from the constitutional traditions com-
mon to the Member States, as general principles of Community law”. In essence, the Member 
States cannot fight the consequences of forming a supranational legal order, and dictate the 
meaning of ordre public, but simultaneously the Court would do well to exercise sensitivity 
when dealing with important national values. 
Considering all of the above, there are several different ways to conceptualize how the dy-
namic between the EU and the Member States functions - as regards to ordre public. The first 
option is to assume that there is in fact a specific EU ordre public which is carefully shaped by 
the European Court of Justice by means of engaging in an indirect dialogue with national 
courts. The second option is that there is a mutual understanding between the EU and the 
Member States as to what the core of ordre public constitutes. In other words, in some re-
spects it is shared. Finally, it is also possible to conceptualize ordre public as a national safety 
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valve, something the EU is willing to tolerate and accommodate as a necessary evil when 
Member States protect their vital national interests from supranational intrusion.104  
This complicated relationship between the European Union and its Member States inherently 
raises more questions than it provides answers. The task is made harder by the fact that the 
concepts of public interest, public policy (ordre public) and public security are difficult to 
analyze. The only way to properly understand their practical applications is to examine the 
express derogations laid down by the Treaty and then analyze how he European Court of Jus-
tice has applied said derogations in its case law. In the next part, we will do exactly that.  
3.3 Restricting the Free Movement of Services   
In the second chapter we established the legal framework concerning the specific rights that 
service providers and receivers enjoy in the European Union. But a national measure that re-
stricts the free movement of services does not automatically mean it is incompatible with said 
freedom. The concept of public policy (ordre public) and public security can be used to pro-
tect the sovereignty of the Member States; allowing EU countries to impose restrictive 
measures in order to protect the very existence of their state or the fundamental values of their 
constitutional order.105  
It is important to emphasize that while the public policy and security exceptions do not really 
differ from similar exceptions in other international agreements, their intention can be some-
what different when compared to the classic conception of ordre public in international rela-
tions. In the European Union, the public policy or security exception does not render void the 
will of the parties but instead only excludes a specific part of national legislation from the 
equation. Simultaneously, this national exception is integrated into Community law as the Eu-
ropean Union takes the national rule into account.106 In essence, when the European Court of 
Justice rules in favor of one Member State and accepts its public policy defence,, the norm 
                                                 
104 Corthaut, p.38. 
105 Wyatt 2011, p.572; Barnard 2013, p.496; Corthaut 2012, p.71. 
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becomes part of the existing European legal framework. The phrase ‘unity in diversity’ de-
scribes this dynamic quite adeptly.  
3.3.1 The Treaty Derogations  
The express derogations, that can be relied upon in order to justify obstacles to the free 
movement of services, are laid down in Articles 52 and 62 TFEU. Article 52 concerns the 
right of establishment but Article 62 expands the same provision to include the freedom to 
provide services.  
“The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice 
the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing 
for special treatment of foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security….” 
TFEU Article 52(1)107 
As we can see, Member States have the possibility to use these express derogations in order to 
preserve their sovereign rights. The burden of proof lies on the defendant state; it has to pro-
vide evidence that the national measure can be justified on the basis of public policy or secu-
rity.108 We have established earlier that Member States cannot unilaterally dictate the scope of 
public policy or security; the CJEU specifically stated in Commission v. Austria that utilizing 
the express derogations is not possible without putting forward concrete proof capable of es-
tablishing that the national measure is required in order to avoid some threat to a fundamental 
interest of society.109 The Court also concluded in Orfanopoulos that a particularly restrictive 
interpretation is necessary in the case of citizens of the Union.110 In addition, using these der-
ogations is not possible when Union directives have comprehensively harmonized the field.111 
                                                 
107 Public health is also included in Article 52 TFEU, but it will not be examined in this paper.  
108 Barnard 2013, p.497. 
109 Case C-161/07 Commission v Austria [2008] ECR-I-10671, para. 37; Case C-54/99 Scientologie 
[2000] ECR I-1335, para 17.  
110 Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos [2004] ECR I-5257, para. 65.   
111 Case C-421/98 Commission v. Spain [2000] ECR I-10375, para 42. 
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The CJEU reiterated in Attanasio that the public policy and public security provisions cannot 
be used when the national restriction is serving purely an economic goal of some sort. 112 
Therefore, for example, Spanish authorities cannot use the express derogations in order to ex-
clude Finnish video game developer from the local market even if the unemployment figures 
among young Spanish software specialists are high and giving beneficiary treatment to nation-
als would serve political purposes. That being said, it is possible to contemplate that in some 
instances the Court might allow protective measures to be taken in order to safeguard the eco-
nomic interests of specific individuals. As an example, refusing to recognize and enforce 
out-of-state court decisions that are seen as excessive could be justified on the basis of public 
policy.113  
Even though public policy and public security are separate derogations in Article 52(1), and 
we have approached these terms as separate concepts in this thesis, there is evidence to sug-
gest that the Court can sometimes incorporate public security under the umbrella of public 
policy.114 The boundary between these two concepts was a matter of careful consideration in 
Tsakouridis. In the case, the Court concluded that matters concerning both the internal and 
external security of a Member State, the functioning of the institutions and essential public 
services, as well as the survival of the population, were within the concept of public securi-
ty.115 On the other hand, the Court concluded that the issue could also be considered as a mat-
ter of public policy.116   
Regarding Article 52 TFEU, it is difficult to pinpoint what the extent of the public security 
concept is. It can cover all forms of security, both external and internal.117 It has been said that 
public security can be defined as “the entire field of rules……adopted in the interest of the 
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para 34.   
113 Hoško 2014, p.210.  
114 Barnard 2013, p.498. 
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political and social integrity of society”.118 However, despite such a broad definition, there 
have only been a handful of cases in which the public security defence has been invoked suc-
cessfully.119 And this is not a surprise, because the CJEU has been adamant that national au-
thorities should only invoke the public security defence in rare circumstances. In Johnston, a 
case in which the exclusion of women from a considerable part of police activities was chal-
lenged, the Court stated that the public security exception does not “lend [itself] to a wide in-
terpretation and it is not possible to infer from [it] that there is inherent in the Treaty a gen-
eral provision covering all measures taken for reasons of public safety”.120 This ‘Johnston 
principle’ was later reiterated in Bond, when the Court concluded that a narrow interpretation 
of the entire Article 52 TFEU is necessary.121  
It is undeniable that there can be considerable ambiguity when we examine concepts such as 
public policy, security or interest. For instance, the Court itself has acknowledged the elusive 
nature of public policy; stating in Van Duyn that it may vary from one country to another and 
from one period to another. 122 As a result, it would be logical to assume that the margin of 
discretion, bestowed upon national authorities, can also evolve over time.  
In order to better understand how the express derogations function, we will examine them 
from two different perspectives. We will first try to determine how Article 52 TFEU is applied 
when individuals are under the magnifying glass, and then we will examine how these excep-
tions function when the behavior of legal entities is under scrutiny.  
3.3.2 Public Policy (and Security): Natural Persons  
When services move, so do people. Individuals who are service providers can rely on Article 
56 TFEU; in conjunction with the Citizens’ Rights Directive Article 6 (CDR). People who 
spend less than three months in another Member State while providing services are covered by 
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119 Hatzopoulos, p.147.  
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the CDR provisions just like any other migrant.123 However, there is some ambiguity regard-
ing the relationship between the CDR and Article 56 TFEU. In principle, the Treaty provisions 
will always prevail over the directive but on the other hand it is possible that in some instances 
the CDR functions as a gap filler of sorts. At the very least, the Citizens’ Rights Directive 
strengthens the concept of Union citizenship even when the Court primarily applies the Treaty 
provisions in its rulings.124  
As far as individuals are considered, the main focus of the public policy and security excep-
tions to the four freedoms – in our case the free movement of services – lies on the personal 
characteristics and conduct of the individual. For instance, the host Member State may want to 
rely on the express derogations in case a foreign citizen of a very questionable character seeks 
access.125 For instance, national authorities might want to rely on the public security exception 
if there is reason to believe that the service provider is involved in terrorist activities. After the 
deadly attacks in Paris, that left 130 people dead, the question of border security and personal 
conduct of visitors and migrants is once again a hot topic in Europe.  
3.3.2.1 Personal Conduct  
The matter of personal conduct was under careful examination in Van Duyn. Mrs Van Duyn 
was not allowed to enter into the United Kingdom to work as a secretary for the Church of 
Scientology. The British authorities saw the church’s activities as harmful to society, even 
though being a member of the church was not illegal in the United Kingdom. In 1968 the 
Minister of Health stated in the House of Commons that: “Scientology is a pseu-
do-philosophical cult. Scientology is socially harmful. It alienates members of families from 
each other…There is evidence that children are now being indoctrinated”.126  
The minister stated that, while there was no existing law to prohibit the practice of Scientolo-
gy, restricting the overall influence of Scientology was necessary. There was no ambiguity in 
                                                 
123 Barnard 2013, p.378. 
124 Ibid, p.473–474.  
125 Corthaut 2012, p.96.  
126 Hurri 2014, p.21.  
  
31 
 
the UK law as any foreigner could be refused entry in the case that such action would be 
‘conducive to the public good’.  
The European Court of Justice ruled eventually that it was not necessary for the personal con-
duct to be criminalized, before a Member State could invoke the express derogations and the 
public policy exception.127 As a result, the British authorities were allowed to classify the ac-
tivity as “socially harmful” and therefore take the necessary administrative steps to rectify the 
situation.128 The second question in Van Duyn was related to the nature of personal conduct. 
The Court concluded that, in principle, past associations should not be used to restrict free 
movement within the Community but a present association with an organization could consti-
tute personal conduct. This is so, because ongoing association reflects voluntary participation 
in the activities of the organization as well as identification with its aims and designs.129 
It is relevant to point out that, despite the eventual ruling, there was some friction between the 
UK government and the Court regarding the extent of ordre public. The position of United 
Kingdom was clear: Scientology was undesirable and Community law was of little signifi-
cance to the national definition of public policy. The Commission disagreed, it stated that pub-
lic policy should be interpreted in the context of Community law and any national criteria only 
offer support during its application.130 Ultimately, the Court concluded that discretion should 
be given to the competent national authorities but that in the future the Community institutions 
would have the final word over the application of the ordre public limitation.131   
In Van Duyn the Court essentially implied that the host state, in this case the United Kingdom, 
could refuse a foreign national to enter the country on public policy grounds even if similar 
restrictions do not apply to its own citizens. In essence, this would mean that a British national 
would always have the option of working for the Church of Scientology while citizens of other 
Member States would not be afforded the same courtesy. The Court used principles of interna-
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tional law to justify its approach; concluding that direct discrimination can take place in such 
situations, because the Member States can never refuse the right of entry or residence from 
their own nationals.132  
However, in its subsequent case law the CJEU has made it clear that the general principle of 
non-discrimination should be respected. In Adoui, a French national had moved into the city of 
Liège in Belgium and had applied for a residence permit. The Belgian authorities refused and 
invoked the public policy defence, because her personal conduct was undesirable. Ms Rezguia 
Adoui worked in a local establishment where waitresses displayed themselves in the window 
and then offered services to clients for monetary compensation.133 The authorities intervened 
despite the reality that prostitution was not criminalized by Belgian legislation.134 In its ruling, 
the Court stated that Member States should not apply the public policy or security defence in a 
way that would have the effect of ‘applying an arbitrary distinction to the detriment of nation-
als of other Member States’.135 In essence, Member States should always be consistent in their 
approach and give equal treatment to migrants when a specific activity is allowed in the coun-
try.136  
The European Court of Justice has repeatedly underlined that the Treaty exceptions should 
only be invoked in case of a ‘genuine, present and a sufficiently serious threat to one of the 
fundamental interests of society’.137 The Court has also used the criteria of ‘fundamental im-
portance for a country’s existence’ as regards to public security.138 However, there seems to be 
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no clear distinction in the CJEU’s subsequent case law139 and, for the purposes of this paper, 
the above mentioned criteria (genuine, present and a sufficiently serious threat) applies to both 
exceptions equally.  
As an example, in Jipa the Court ruled that a mere previous deportation from another Member 
State, on the basis of illegal residence, would not be enough to invoke Article 52 TFEU and 
restrict the right to free movement.140 The CJEU also considered the relevance of ‘present and 
genuine threat’ in Calfa. In this case, the authorities in Greece had permanently expelled Calfa 
on the basis of possessing illegal substances. According to Greek law, foreign nationals, who 
were convicted for drug related crimes, were automatically be expelled for life.141 The Court 
ruled that an automatic expulsion without sufficiently taking into account the personal conduct 
of the offender was in breach of the Treaty.142 Furthermore, the Court said in Cetinkaya that 
national authorities should also take into consideration all the relevant factors after the initial 
decision. It is possible that the threat evaluation – and the risk to public security - changes if 
there is a shift in the personal conduct of the offender.143 In other words, sometimes individu-
als should be afforded a second chance.  
If we examine the Citizens’ Rights Directive, we can see that the previously mentioned case 
law can also be found in Article 27(2). It explicitly states that any action taken on the grounds 
of public policy or security has to be based on the personal conduct of the individual and pre-
vious convictions in themselves should not be used as the sole yardstick.  
3.3.2.1 Available Measures and Fundamental Human Rights 
In situations, where a Member State decides to take action against any individual on public 
policy or security grounds, the host state has to pay close attention to fundamental human 
rights. The Court emphasized this in Carpenter in which Mrs Carpenter, a Philippine national 
married to an English citizen, had been denied the right to reside in the United Kingdom. Mrs 
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Carpenter claimed that the national measure adopted against her would restrict her husband’s 
capability to provide and receive services. Her argument was simple; since she looked after his 
children, her eventual deportation would either separate the family or force Mr Carpenter to 
leave Europe.144 The Court eventually concluded that, while Member States could invoke the 
express derogations and the concept of public policy and public security to justify restrictive 
national measures, such measures would have to be compatible with the fundamental rights as 
they are laid out in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms; namely ‘the right to respect for private and family life’.145 The Court was unequiv-
ocal in its ruling: The decision to deport Mrs Carpenter did not strike a fair balance and was 
declared void.146 This result can be seen as a sound victory for human rights. On the other 
hand, some have raised concerns that using the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights) in con-
junction with market freedoms, in this manner, leaves virtually no margin of discretion for 
national authorities.147 
In any case, after Carpenter, the Court has reiterated several times that fundamental human 
rights should be taken into account when deporting a migrant.148 However, applying this prin-
ciple in real life can be difficult, because the Treaty does not specify the kind of measures that 
can be taken by national authorities on grounds of public policy or security.149 At least we can 
be quite certain that permanent deportation, as was the case in Calfa, does not necessarily sit 
well with the idea of proportionality and fundamental human rights.  
Such a drastic measure should only be used when absolutely necessary. For instance, the Court 
ruled in PI that any expulsion measure is conditional on the requirement that a genuine threat 
affecting one of the fundamental interests of society is at hand. The Member State should also 
consider other factors such as the age and the economic situation of the individual and his/her 
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state of health.150 We can see a similar approach in the Citizens’ Rights Directive Article 28(1) 
which states that the host country should consider the age, health and economic situation 
among other things before enacting an expulsion decision on the grounds of public policy or 
security.   
National authorities should be able to impose less severe sanctions for unlawful activities in 
most situations. One example would be to restrict movement within the country as was the 
case in Olazabal. In this case, a Spanish national, who was a member of the separatist ETA 
organization, was banned from residing in the vicinity of the Spanish border in France. This 
happened after the person in question was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment for kidnapping 
an industrialist in Bilbao.151 The case caused some uncertainty, because similar measures were 
not available for French citizens. Regardless of the principle of non-discrimination, the Court 
ruled that since Union law allowed deportation in extreme situations, less severe measures 
(restrictions on residence) should also be available.152 In essence, the Court favoured propor-
tionality over the concept of non-discrimination.  
It is evident that modern technology and creative thinking can enable a wide variety of nation-
al measures that can be taken on grounds of public policy and security. Instead of draconian 
measures such as deportation, or banning individuals from living in certain parts of the coun-
try, it might be better to simply monitor the behaviour and activities of service providers or 
receivers who might pose a risk to public safety. Besides, Article 32(1) CDR states that Mem-
ber States cannot permanently exclude individuals from their territory. The ‘right to reapply’ is 
enshrined in EU law and individuals can request for their expulsion decision to be lifted. This 
can take place after a reasonable amount of time or three years after a material change in their 
circumstances has taken place.153  
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3.3.3 Public Policy (and Security): Legal Persons 
We have now established that Member States can invoke the public policy or security provi-
sions in order to restrict the activities of natural persons. However, there was little case law 
concerning the behavior or activities of corporate bodies at the dawn of the new millennium. 
In Segers the Court concluded that express derogations could be used to combat fraud154 and 
in Open Skies the court assessed if a national measure such as the refusal to grant an operating 
license to an airline could be justified on the basis that it constituted a genuine threat to public 
policy or security.155  
But only in Omega did the Court really provide a striking example as to how the express der-
ogations could be used to restrict corporate conduct – namely on the basis of public policy. In 
Omega, the German authorities took action against a company that was responsible for organ-
izing a game played in a laser dome.156 The game revolves around simulated killing of partic-
ipants; individuals use laser pistols in confined spaces while trying to score points by means of 
hitting one another with a laser beam or other such device (infrared is usually the technical 
tool that is used in these activities).  
The municipal authorities in Bonn, namely the mayor, determined that they could not accept 
the existence of a ‘murder game’ as it constituted an affront to human dignity. Human dignity 
is inviolable and protected by Article 1 of the German constitution (Grundgesetz or basic 
law).157 Eventually the local police authority intervened and issued an order against Omega. 
The company was forbidden from facilitating the game and also threatened with a DEM 
10 000 fine for each game played in breach of the order.158 The order was issued in accord-
ance with the law governing the North Rhine-Westphalia Police Authorities (Ordnungs-
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behördengesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen) which states that the authority may take necessary ac-
tion in case there is a risk to public order or safety.  
The company, which was supplied by a U.K partner under a franchising contract, objected and 
eventually appealed to the Federal Administrative Court of Germany (Bundesverwaltung-
sgerich). Omega argued that these national measures infringed the free movement of services 
and were in breach of Article 56 TFEU (formerly known as Article 49 EC), because the game 
organizer imported parts from the British company Pulsar.159 As a result, the German court 
opted to use the preliminary reference procedure to find out if the national law was in fact 
compatible with Community rules.   
The problem for the European Court of Justice was that, while the notion of human dignity 
can be found in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the concept is somewhat am-
biguous under EU law and not as well developed as its German counterpart.160 Nevertheless, 
the Court had to decide whether it was possible to use ‘human dignity’ as a public policy justi-
fication when restricting intra-Community trade. The Court had to tread carefully. It had pre-
viously established in Schmidberger that restricting free movement could be justified on the 
basis of protecting fundamental rights.161 But, on the other hand, Advocate General Jacobs had 
also warned in that very same case that Member States might pursue illegitimate objectives 
while simultaneously proclaiming that such measures are necessary to protect a fundamental 
right recognized by national law.162  
The Court was in quite the predicament and had to strike a careful balance since fully recog-
nizing the German interpretation of ‘human dignity’ would have been essentially a value 
judgment against all those Member States that allowed similar laser games in their territo-
ries.163 In essence, the Omega case demonstrated that there was a conflict between two legal 
systems. Pulsar’s actions were completely legal in the United Kingdom while at the same time 
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the German Constitution and the concept of ‘human dignity’ apparently required interfer-
ence.164  
The Court eventually ruled that protecting fundamental human rights, human dignity included, 
was a valid justification when invoking the public policy defence.165 The Court ruled that 
German authorities were able to exercise a margin of discretion when interpreting the concept 
of ‘human dignity’.166 Furthermore, the Court stated that it was not indispensable for the 
measure to correspond to a conception shared by all the Member States – thus evading any 
controversial value judgments.167 The conclusion was that the German prohibition was not 
excessive as it only prohibited one aspect of the game; firing laser beams on human targets.168   
The Omega ruling has been a much discussed subject in academic literature. In many ways it 
was a landmark case and showed how the Court was able to exercise flexibility while as-
sessing the public policy defence in an environment of value pluralism absent of settled case- 
law.169  
After Omega, it is possible that a wide variety of measures can be taken to restrict electronic 
entertainment on the basis of public policy and morality. For instance, some groups in Ger-
many have raised the idea of prohibiting violent and explicit computer games altogether.170 On 
the other hand, the ruling should not be seen as a ‘carte blanche’ by any means. Even in situa-
tion where the constitutional norm – in this case the concept of ‘human dignity’ – is compati-
ble with the EU legal order, the national measure has to be proportionate as well. In Omega, 
the outcome might have been different had the national authorities issued a blanket ban against 
all laser pistol games. The European Court of Justice concluded in Omega that the need for 
proportionality is not excluded merely, because one Member State has chosen a system of 
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protection different from that adopted by another state.171 We will leave the matter of propor-
tionality and necessity aside for now as they will be examined comprehensively in the follow-
ing chapter.    
3.3.4 Public Policy (and Security) and Secondary Legislation: Lost in Translation?   
We established previously that the Citizens’ Rights Directive also contains certain public pol-
icy and security provisions. For instance, Article 27 states that the freedom of movement and 
residence can be restricted on the grounds of public policy and security as long as the measure 
taken does not serve economic ends. Similarly, public policy appears in the E-commerce Di-
rective and in the Audio Visual and Media Services Directive.172 Both these Directives state 
that Member States may take necessary measures in order to protect, among other things, hu-
man dignity and national security. The concept of proportionality can also be found from these 
legislative acts so there is little ambiguity in relation to the case law of the Court. However, 
the lines begin to blur when we examine the concept of public policy and public security in the 
Services Directive.   
Article 14 in the Services Directive dictates that discriminatory national measures are strictly 
forbidden. This includes natural persons on the basis of their nationality or, in the case of legal 
persons, the location of their registered office. However, Article 16 states that certain 
non-discriminatory measures may be accepted on the basis of public policy or security if they 
are necessary and proportionate The Directive defines the concepts of public policy and secu-
rity as ‘overriding reasons relating to the public interest recognized as such in the case law of 
the Court of Justice’ in Article 4.173 A somewhat similar approach was adopted in Commission 
v. Luxembourg, in which the AG Trstenjak stated that the concept of public policy covers 
“rules…that meet the imperative requirements of public interest”.174  
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Using public policy (or security) as a component of - or in conjunction - with public interest is 
problematic considering that we have previously established that there can be inherent differ-
ences between the terms public policy and public interest. The two concepts are not always 
identical; it is possible to conceptualize public interest as an intrinsic part of public policy but 
by no means is public interest indispensable to the legal order. However, we have defined the 
concept of public policy as something more profound – it protects the fundamental values of 
legal and political order of any nation - and it should only be invoked as a defence when a 
sufficiently serious threat to some fundamental interest of society is at hand.175  
It might be possible to disregard this obscurity; claiming that it is a result of inadequate trans-
lation. For instance, some language versions of the Commission v. Luxembourg ruling use the 
definition public policy while others have opted to use the term public interest.176 It is obvi-
ously true that interpreters are not expected to produce texts that are completely identical. 
Translations are always approximations; they are rarely equivalent. But legal certainty de-
mands that different language versions should produce similar legal effects.177 And the im-
portant question remains: If the use of public policy and public interest in Commission v. 
Luxembourg was simply a result of linguistic diversity then why is the same approach adopted 
in the Services Directive?  
It is possible that we will find a better explanation to this question when we examine the case 
law of the European Court of Justice more thoroughly. In the following chapter we will ap-
proach the subject of objective justifications, or overriding reasons in the public interest (OR-
PI), that can also be used to restrict the free movement of services. Perhaps then we can begin 
to understand why these abstract institutions - public interest, public policy and public security 
- seem to appear side-by-side, not only in academic literature, but also in EU law.   
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3.4 Conclusion 
The spectrum of the public policy and security exceptions are in first instance determined by 
national authorities and laws. 178  The interpretation of public policy may differ from one 
Member State to another, as was the case in Omega, and in these circumstances the Court has 
to tread carefully. But as we have examined, the European Court of Justice ultimately controls 
the limits of ordre public and is responsible for setting the material terms regarding its invoca-
tion.179 The CJEU has to assess the necessity of the measure, avoid any unnecessary value 
judgments and simultaneously uphold the fundamental principles of EU law. The Carpenter 
case demonstrated that the Court can, in theory, investigate almost any legislative or adminis-
trative act if there is a chance that the measure has negative ramifications to the free move-
ment provisions laid down in the Treaty. We saw that Mary Carpenter’s right to residency 
could be derived from the fact that she provided support to her husband; a service provider 
who enjoyed free movement rights by working throughout Europe.180 This can be seen as ex-
cessive judicial activism or constructive balancing as the likes of Robert Alexy have stated.181 
Alexy’s ‘Law of Balancing’ assumes that the Court should always be active when conflicting 
interests are competing against one another. According to this theory the Court should assess 
every situation thoroughly when determining the underlying general interest. In other words, 
the Court has to define how far one principle can be infringed for the benefit of another.182 It is 
the “wisdom of knowing how to distinguish the nature of trouble when choosing the lesser 
evil” as Niccolò Machiavelli stated in Il Principe.  
When we consider the idea of balancing opposing interests, we have witnessed that special 
circumstances and the sensitive natures of the protected interests allow competent national 
authorities some margin of discretion. 183 If the restrictiveness of the national measure is mi-
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nor, while the overall importance of the public policy or public security justification for this 
interference is high, then it is likely that the Court concludes that the national measure fulfills 
the principle of proportionality. Obviously this is a rather vague description, but in the fol-
lowing chapter the concept of proportionality will be examined in more detail. 
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4. THE JUSTIFICATION TEST: EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF 
THE TREATY  
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous section we witnessed that Member States may enact restrictions if they are 
proven to be reasonable and based on valid reasons. As discussed before, Article 56 TFEU 
prohibits discriminatory national measures unless they can be justified on the basis of Article 
52 TFEU - public policy or public security.184 But these exceptions should be interpreted nar-
rowly.185 We examined previously that only a genuine threat to a fundamental interest of soci-
ety enables the invocation of public policy or security. Regardless of these requirements, 
Member States across the old continent have felt the need to apply and uphold a wide variety 
of restrictions to the free movement of services in order to protect the general public inter-
est.186 
4.1.1 The CJEU: Building Bridges or Conjuring Confusion?     
As a result of the ensuing friction – between the narrow interpretation of the express deroga-
tions and the need to protect national interests - the European Court of justice has developed 
another legal framework in its case law. In academic literature terms such as ‘judicially creat-
ed exceptions’, or ‘objective justifications’ are used to describe the new legal reality.187 To be 
more precise, the Court has used the term ‘overriding reasons in the general interest’ in the 
field of services.188 In the field of goods, the Court has adopted a similar approach after the 
famous Cassis de Dijon decision – though the terminology can be slightly different.189    
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It is quite evident that the Court of Justice has played a vital role in the development of the 
European Union. Many of the concepts that are fundamental to the way in which the Union 
functions cannot be ascertained from the Treaties themselves but instead from the case law of 
the CJEU.190 But the development of these objective justifications, outside the express powers 
given to Member States, can also conjure confusion and criticism. The CJEU’s extensive in-
fluence over the legal order of the European Union has repeatedly resulted in allegations of 
excessive judicial activism.191  
Various authors have implied that, in principle, directly discriminatory national measures can 
only be applied on the basis of Article 52 TFEU (public policy and public security) while in-
directly discriminatory measures can be justified, not only on the basis of Article 52, but also 
on reasons related to public interest.192 But it can be difficult to decisively determine the re-
strictiveness of the national measure; is it directly or indirectly discriminatory?193 Also, the 
rulings of the Court tend to be somewhat ambiguous quite often. As the Member States and 
national authorities proclaim that specific measures are required to protect the general public 
interest, or on the grounds of public policy or public security, the Court has a habit of concen-
trating primarily on assessing the proportionality of the measure in question. For instance, in 
SIA, the Court stated that while it is important to understand the nature of the restriction – can 
it be allowed as a derogation on the grounds of public policy and security or in accordance 
with the case law and the doctrine of ‘overriding reasons in the public interest’ – the measure 
must always satisfy the principle of proportionality.194 Similarly, in Pfleger the Court con-
cluded that the concept of ‘overriding reasons in the public interest’ can be used in conjunc-
tion with Article 52 TFEU but such restrictions should also comply with the relevant condi-
tions of proportionality as they are laid down in the case law.195 
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This makes systemization rather burdensome, but it is also the reason why we must thoroughly 
analyze the ‘overriding reasons in the public interest’ (or ORPI) concept thoroughly. It will 
become evident that sometimes there is only a thin line between the express Treaty deroga-
tions (Article 52 TFEU) and the objective justifications developed by the Court (ORPI).  
4.2 Overriding Reasons in the Public Interest (ORPI) 
4.2.1 The Origins 
We can trace the present-day ‘objective justification test’ back to van Binsbergen; a case that 
is over four decades old. It was in van Binsbergen in which the Court considered the extent of 
public policy and public security as exceptions to the free movement of services. The CJEU 
established that indistinctly applicable national measures could be justified, provided they 
have an objective justification and are also proportional all things considered. 196 To be more 
precise, the Court originally used the expression “measures which are less restrictive”. This 
concept was developed further in cases such as Gouda, Säger and Commission v Netherlands.  
The Court concluded in Säger that the freedom to provide services may be restricted in situa-
tions in which there is an imperative reason relating to the public interest; provided that the 
measure applies to all persons equally (the principle of non-discrimination). The Court also 
stated that these measures should always be objectively necessary and must not exceed as to 
what is required to attain the stated objective.197 This was also the case in the two other deci-
sions; the Court was adamant that only a restriction pursuing a legitimate public interest could 
be accepted.198  
Gouda demonstrates how the television market in Europe had begun to transform at the sunset 
of the Cold War era. Various public broadcasting monopolies were experiencing difficulties as 
new satellite based delivery services appeared. Simultaneously, Member States wanted to pro-
tect non-commercial radio and television broadcasting systems as part of a cultural policy. In 
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Gouda, the Dutch Media Control authority imposed a fine on cable network operators for air-
ing advertisements that did not comply with national requirements.199 For the CJEU it was 
simply a question of striking a careful balance as deliberately protectionist measures would 
have had negative economic consequences, but the Court also had to recognize that there were 
some legitimate public policy related reasons for restricting the inward flow of television ser-
vices.200 A test of some sort was necessary for delicate situations such as these; and a test is 
exactly what the Court eventually constructed.   
4.2.2 The Test of Justification 
Even though this thesis mainly concentrates on the freedom to provide services, it was a case 
concerning establishment in which the European Court of Justice refined the necessary re-
quirements for the national measure to satisfy ‘the test of justification’.201 In Gebhard, a Ger-
man citizen Mr Reinhard Gebhard had moved to Italy to live with his family of four. He had 
been authorised to work as a lawyer in Germany (rechtsanwalt) and Gebhard, as he wanted to 
pursue his career in Italy, eventually opened a chamber in Milan while using the title “av-
vocato”. However, after several complaints, the Milan Bar Council decided that Gebhard did 
not possess the necessary qualifications required in Italy and prohibited him from using the 
title “avvocato” and also denied him the right to open a branch office in Milan.202 Further-
more, the Council penalized Gebhard and suspended his right to pursue his professional activ-
ity for the duration of six months (sospensione dell’ esercizio dell’ attività professionale).203  
The Milan Bar Council argued that the case should have been handled under the rules for the 
provision of services, because according to Italian regulations Gebhard was not ‘established’ 
there. The European Court of Justice ruled otherwise and concluded that prohibiting Mr Rein-
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hard Gebhard from using the title “avvocato” was an infringement of his rights and restricted 
the freedom of establishment.204  
The Court formulated the test of justification when it concluded that “national measures liable 
to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms…must fulfil four condi-
tions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by impera-
tive requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of 
the objective which they pursue; they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
it”205   
We can distinguish four conditions that the national measure has to fulfil in order satisfy the 
test.  
(A) The measure must be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion  
(B) The measure must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest 
(C) The measure must be suitable for securing the stated objective 
(D) The measure must not go beyond what is necessary to secure the stated objective 
The Court also clarified in its judgment that this test of justification applies also to other free-
doms such as the freedom to provide services.206  
If we examine the Gebhard-formula step-by-step, we can witness that it is to be used in situa-
tions in which a national measure ‘hinders free movement or makes it less attractive’. This is a 
particularly broad approach since, in principle, any regulation can restrict access to markets 
(see section 2.3.3). In any event, if the answer to this first step is ‘yes’, then the Court has to 
assess whether the measure is applied in a discriminatory fashion. We have previously ana-
lysed the differences between distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures; 
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non-discrimination in this context means that the action is administered equally but its effects 
are unequal.207  
The second requirement, meaning that the measure has to pursue a valid aim, is yet another 
obscure condition. We will later examine the different justifications recognized by the Court 
but it suffices to say that in most instances Member States claim that they are pursuing a le-
gitimate objective. In the next chapter we will also try to find out whether there is any distinct 
difference between ‘objectives in the general interest’ and the express Treaty derogations such 
as public policy and public safety. The last two components of the Gebhard-formula refer to 
the overall proportionality of the national measure.208 We will now examine the concept of 
proportionality in more detail.    
4.2.3 The Principle of Proportionality 
Originally, there were no explicit set of principles laying out how to test the legality of state 
action in the context of Community rules. Since the Treaty on the European Community did 
not contain these elements, the European Court of Justice had to establish a legal framework 
for the purposes of administrative legality.209 It used the existing national legal systems as a 
springboard; the concept of proportionality was well shaped in countries such as Germany. In 
Germany the concept of proportionality was used to challenge excessive policing measures.210  
Today, after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the principle of proportionality is enshrined 
in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In the context of the four freedoms, proportion-
ality is used as a tool when contesting the legality of Member State action.211 However, we 
can see this approach already in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, a case that is over four 
decades old, in which the proportionality principle was used as a ground of judicial review.212     
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While the EU courts are primarily responsible for determining the scope and extent of propor-
tionality,213 the burden of proof is on the defending state to show that the national measure is 
appropriate.214 Proportionality stricto sensu means that the Member State has to show that  
there is a balance between the resulting restriction and the aim sought by or the result brought 
by the national rule.215 As we saw earlier in the Gebhard-formula, this means that the measure 
has to be suitable for attaining the stated objective and must not go beyond what is necessary 
to attain this goal.  The question of suitability of the national measure often requires only 
marginal control whereas the Court has to carefully determine whether the pursued aim could 
be satisfied by less restrictive instruments.216 It should be emphasized that the burden of proof 
cannot, however, be so extensive that the Member State should exhaustively demonstrate that 
no other conceivable measure exists for the attainment of the objective under the same condi-
tions.217  
4.2.3.1 Proportionality: Finding the Equilibrium  
We can witness the application of the justification test in De Coster. In this case, Belgian au-
thorities adopted a municipal tax on satellite dishes which had the effect of imposing a charge 
on the reception of television programmes by satellite; a measure which did not apply to the 
reception of programmes by cable.218 The municipality of Watermael-Boitsfort argued that the 
tax on satellite dishes was introduced in order to prevent the ‘uncontrolled proliferation in the 
municipality and thereby preserving the quality of the environment’.219  
The Court ruled that the tax was interfering with the free movement of services, because 
broadcasters from other states were not allowed the same access as Belgian cable broadcast-
ers.220 It was then a question of proportionality; was the measure suitable for the purpose of 
protecting the environment and did it not go beyond what was necessary? The Court ruled that 
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this was not the case; the tax was not the least restrictive method of achieving the stated objec-
tive. The Court concluded that less restrictive mechanisms were available such as regulating 
the size of the satellite dishes, their positions and attachment or the general use of communal 
dishes.221  
Correspondingly, the CJEU used the proportionality test in Josemans, in which the Court ruled 
that limiting access to coffee shops, and therefore the sale of cannabis, could be justified on 
the basis of public policy related arguments. In this case the Municipal Council of Maastricht 
banned any coffee-shop owner from allowing to his establishment people who did not have 
their actual place of residence in the Netherlands.222 Mr Josemans was penalized for circum-
venting this regulation and the Mayor of Maastricht ordered his shop closed down.223 The 
Court eventually ruled that excluding foreign residents from the market place in order to 
maintain public order and combat drug tourism was appropriate. The CJEU explicitly rejected 
the possibility of allowing non-residents to enter the coffee shops without having the permis-
sion to purchase cannabis as this might have encouraged illegal trade.224 In addition, the Court 
stated that other less restrictive measures had proven to be inefficient such as restricting open-
ing hours.225  
Josemans demonstrates that the Court is willing to consider distinctly applicable measures 
(outright preferential treatment given to some group) in situations concerning public order or 
public policy. The approach can be seen as pragmatic and pro-state226 but it also raises some 
questions regarding the relationship of ‘overriding reasons in the public interest’ and public 
policy and security as they exist in the Treaty provisions. We remember that only a genuine 
and a sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society should, in principle, enable 
the invocation of Article 52 TFEU (public policy and security). However, in Josemans the 
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main objective was to end a nuisance of sort. The local authorities in Maastricht were dissatis-
fied with the fact that a large number of tourists purchased and consumed cannabis in the mu-
nicipality. The government of Netherlands argued that the prevention of drug tourism should 
be seen as a ‘public interest objective’ while the Court remained inconclusive.227 In any event, 
the CJEU ruled that the restriction itself justified.228  
The nature of proportionality was also assessed in Jyske. Jyske, a branch of the Danish NS 
Jyske Bank, offered financial services in Gibraltar without being established there. 229 The 
Spanish FIU (financial intelligence unit) suspected that Jyske was used for money laundering 
purposes and demanded information regarding its customers. Jyske refused; citing the banking 
secrecy rules of Gibraltar.230 Following the investigation and refusal to provide information, 
the local authorities imposed financial penalties to the tune of €1 700 000.231 The Court even-
tually concluded that, in principle, requiring credit institutions to provide information directly 
to the FIU does constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services as it gives rise to 
additional costs and administrative burdens.232 But the Court concluded that the measure was 
justified; the prevention of money laundering meets the criteria of ‘overriding reasons in the 
public interest’ and the information itself was necessary to effectively supervise and suspend 
suspicious financial transactions.233 Jyske can be seen as a pragmatic decision, especially so in 
the age of terrorist financing. Legitimate security risks should be taken into account when as-
sessing the extent regulations concerning banking secrecy.    
In addition, the Court has emphasized that national measures restricting the free movement of 
services should be clear, precise and predictable as regards their legal effects. This is particu-
larly important when there are unfavourable consequences for individuals. The CJEU specifi-
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cally stated in SIAT that if the measure does not fulfil these requirements then it cannot be 
considered proportionate.234  
4.2.3.1 Proportionality: Strict Scrutiny or Sensitivity to National Values?  
So far we have established that proportionality, in the context of the four freedoms, functions 
as a tool in situations where a prima facie restriction has been found and the Member State 
tries to defend its action on the basis of public order, security or some other abstract public 
interest. The Court then has to find a balance between a rights provision (such as Article 56 
TFEU) and a state or public interest.235 
However, there is no definitive way to explain how this principle functions. We could simply 
state that the Court uses a rationalist approach; it assesses whether the administrative measure 
is suitable and necessary in order to reach a stated objective. This is the conventional under-
standing of proportionality as we saw in Gebhard.236 But the problem with this approach is 
that there are no predetermined structures, that is to say something substantive we could use as 
a reference point when the Court presents its argument in hard cases. This is the most common 
criticism of the proportionality approach. If we take it to the extreme, then proportionality can 
be applicable in any situation as all interests are relative and can be weighed against one an-
other; even a relatively light expectation can be measured against the existing the legal 
framework. 237  Adopting such a generally applicable criteria for judicial review would no 
doubt provide flexibility but it would also increase uncertainty in public law.238 And it is true 
that at times it can feel that the CJEU treats the Treaty provisions as if they are relative princi-
ples that can be weighed against other interests such as policies laid down in legislative 
measures.239 If this is the case, the Court may stretch the concept of proportionality at will and 
use it differently in apparently similar cases. On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that 
these different manifestations of the principle are intrinsically related to the nature of the na-
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tional measure; meaning that proportionality is different if the case concerns public policy or 
public security instead of something less relevant as ensuring the balance of sports clubs for 
example.240  
There is also an argument that the Court has adopted two distinct approaches to the principle 
of proportionality. It is said that when it assesses whether Community regulations are in ac-
cordance with the four freedoms (horizontal dimension), it adopts a modest approach. But 
when it assesses national regulations (vertical dimension), it is more willing to quash the reg-
ulatory measure if the Member State has not chosen the least restrictive option available. Pro-
portionality is therefore applied when the Court finds it suitable – when there is a window of 
opportunity to promote a desired outcome.241 In essence, the Court is not functioning as a neu-
tral mediator between various differing interests but as a biased institution with political aims, 
more precisely that of promoting the common European project.242  
If we examine the argument of strict proportionality scrutiny within the vertical dimension, we 
can use Viking to demonstrate that the Court is willing to adopt an activist approach in order to 
strengthen the principles of Community law. Viking, a Finnish Company, wished to reflag its 
vessel Rosella under the Estonian flag in order to decrease wage costs via manning the ship 
with an Estonian crew.243 The Finnish union of seamen (Suomen Merimies-Unioni) demanded 
that, regardless of this change, Viking would have to respect its earlier commitments and fol-
low the Finnish law; that being the collective bargaining agreement. In addition, the union 
demanded that a possible change of flag would not lead to any laying-off of employees on any 
Finnish flag vessels belonging to Viking.244 The union was aware that these expectations 
would essentially render the reflagging pointless but it justified its position on the basis of 
protecting Finnish jobs.245 As a response to an immediate strike threat, Viking sought an in-
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junction restraining the union from breaching the free movement of services and establishment 
provisions.246    
First, the CJEU stated that even though the right to collective action must be recognized as a 
fundamental right, it may also be subject to certain restrictions.247 In essence, the Court first 
established that a restriction existed and then it assessed whether collective action pursued a 
legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty (could the restriction be justified by overriding rea-
sons in the public interest). After this, the CJEU applied the principle of proportionality at its 
own discretion.248 The eventual ruling itself was much criticised. The Court declared that, 
while the protection of workers is a legitimate interest, the policy of preventing ship-owners 
from registering their vessels in another state could not be objectively justified.249  
Essentially, the European Court of Justice implied that these measures were socially legitimate 
but the amount of protectionism involved, and the possibility of fragmentation, jeopardized the 
integrity of Community law. The Court went even further in Laval, in which the Court de-
clared that trade unions, that are not bodies governed by public law, could not rely on the pub-
lic policy provision in order to protect their interests.250 Questions have been raised after Laval 
whether hybrid bodies such as trade unions should be afforded the right for a ‘private policy 
exception’ of sort – so that they can defend their expressive rights.251 
However, even though the Viking and Laval decisions were controversial and raised suspi-
cions, local interests and organizations are not always on the losing side. The claim that CJEU 
prominently serves supranational interests is not waterproof; because even in this thesis we 
have examined several cases in which the CJEU exercised sensitivity to national values and 
ruled in favour of the Member States. For instance, in Omega the court specifically concluded 
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that national authorities must be allowed some margin of discretion.252 We remember that the 
national measure was deemed proportionate. Another similar example can be seen in Schmid-
berger, in the field of goods, in which the Court ruled that environmental groups were allowed 
to demonstrate on the Brenner motorway, for the duration of 30 hours, despite the negative 
consequences to cross-border trade.253  
It must also be recognized that the Court is operating in a diverse environment – surrounded 
by differing and changing social values. For example, the concept of proportionality, and 
finding the correct balance between the Treaty provisions and interests of the Member States, 
has proven to be exceedingly difficult in the world of gambling. The gambling industry is 
known for its controversial elements. On one side there are private operators seeking new op-
portunities in the internal market, while others believe that publicly-owned monopolies are the 
best way to balance the overall benefits and costs of gambling services.254 For the purposes of 
this thesis, it is not practical to examine the regulatory framework and the case law concerning 
online gambling, but it suffices to say that the Court has had to carefully assess how the con-
cept of proportionality can be applied in a field of services that is sensitive to moral evalua-
tions. Even though the overall public perception towards gambling was already changing prior 
to Schindler, the Court itself was still cautious. Two decades ago national authorities pos-
sessed a wide margin of discretion in gambling related activities. In Schindler, the Court stated 
that it is not possible to disregard the moral aspects of gambling and that the general tendency 
of the Member States has been to restrict or even prohibit the practice of gambling. 255  
Over time the CJEU has adjusted its approach together with the changing public perceptions. 
In Placanica the Court already concluded that while Member States are free to set the objec-
tives of their policy on betting and gambling, restrictive measures must satisfy the principle of 
proportionality and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objec-
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tives.256 Likewise, if we examine current trends, then it is quite evident that the principle of 
proportionality is in full use and Member States have less room for manoeuvring.257  
In essence, the proportionality principle appears to be another abstraction that can shapeshift 
when time passes and society’s perceptions change. At times it can be somewhat similar to the 
Wednesbury reasonableness; a test which has been developed by the English courts in admin-
istrative law. According to Wednesbury reasonableness any decision can be challenged if it is 
clearly unreasonable or irrational. Essentially, the authority behind the decision has acted ultra 
vires, outside its competences, because the legislator could not have intended its powers to be 
exercised in such manner.258 On the other hand, the burden of proof in the Wednesbury test, 
according to its definition, lies mainly on the claimant so there is still a stark difference be-
tween these two approaches.    
In any event, it is hard to pinpoint the extent of proportionality or make any definitive norma-
tive assessments regarding its use; meaning that the application of proportionality is either a 
positive or a negative in its current form. The principle of proportionality can be seen as a tool 
that the Court uses to legitimise its decision as it seeks to rationalise its reasoning. But, on the 
other hand, if the CJEU’s interpretation deviates from the conventional understanding of the 
principle, or the interpretation evolves rapidly, then proportionality can cause confusion and 
even be dangerous to legal certainty.259  
Perhaps the best we can do is observe the facts in every specific case and therefore examine 
the principle from an empirical and practical point of view instead of engaging in comprehen-
sive theoretical analysis.260 What this means is that we can observe various justifications ac-
cepted by the Court in order to better comprehend the structure behind its case law. That is 
what we will do next.   
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4.2.4 Justifications Recognized by the Court. 
The Court recognized numerous justifications in Gouda, such as the protection of intellectual 
property, rules intended to protect the recipients of a service, cultural policy in general and 
protecting the archaeological, historical and artistic heritage of a country.261 This is by no 
means a comprehensive list, the CJEU has recognized a number of arguments during the last 
two decades either implicitly or explicitly. The exceptions are numerous, but they can be cat-
egorized into different groups.262  
The first one involves market externalities; this means that the activity or transaction does not 
take into account important outside interests. These include the protection of the environment 
which the Court recognized (again) in Yellow Cab263, port safety264, road safety265 or the need 
to safeguard the reputation of the financial markets.266  
The second group concerns civil liberties; the objective here is that economic activities and 
freedoms should not jeopardize fundamental political values such as human dignity and free-
dom of expression (or assembly). We observed this approach in Omega267- in the context of 
Article 52 TFEU - but also witnessed in Viking268 that the equilibrium between economic 
freedoms and civil liberties can be delicate to say the least. Regardless, the Court has also 
recognized equal treatment between citizens as an argument. In Sayn-Wittgenstein the CJEU 
concluded that this principle is compatible with the EU law as it is also enshrined in Article 20 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.269  
The next category concerns the protection of certain socio-cultural practises; this basically 
means safeguarding important institutions that enable the proper functioning of local markets. 
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The Court has ruled that the desire to avoid disturbances on the labour market270 and prevent-
ing social security fraud or bogus self-employment271 can be considered as valid justifications. 
In addition, the general prevention of abuse of the free movement of services is also seen as a 
valid defence – even if somewhat ambiguous.272 In essence, the Court has concluded that re-
stricting Article 56 TFEU on the basis of safeguarding the reliability and credibility of the 
national market can be legitimate. We should always remember that even though protecting 
the national markets from disturbances can be seen as a legitimate aim, depending on the situ-
ation, the Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that national measures could be adopted for 
purely economic purposes. For instance, in SETTG the CJEU ruled that a Greek law, which 
effectively excluded all tourist guides from other Member States, was a restriction on the free 
movement of services that could not be justified. The Greek government tried to argue that the 
national measure was necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the national economy – 
more specifically it was used to maintain industrial peace and to settle a collective labour dis-
pute.273 The Court, however, was adamant and stated “[it] must be regarded as an economic 
aim which cannot constitute a reason relating to the general interest”.274  
In difficult situations the Court is willing to grant guidance as to what kind of national regula-
tions are proportionate and what kind of expectations are required, ensuring the authorities are 
in compliance with the Treaty. This was demonstrated, for example, in De Coster when the 
Court provided alternative methods to reach the stated objective.275  
The fourth category is related to the preservation of public order. It is inconclusive if this is 
somewhat similar to the concept of public policy and security as they appear in Article 52. The 
CJEU stated in Läärä that the maintenance of order in society is regarded as an ORPI.276 In 
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any event, the effective supervision of the financial sector and the prevention of money laun-
dering are valid justifications in this regard - as we saw in Jyske.277  
It is interesting that the Court specifically stated in Commission v. Italy that the ‘preservation 
of public order and security’ can be used as a general justification despite ruling that the 
measure itself was not proportionate.278 In this case the Italian government wanted to safe-
guard the integrity of private security activities via limiting the amount of licenses given to 
security guards. The measure was adopted as a mechanism to combat against local criminal 
organizations. The government tried to justify its action; stating that there was a risk of infil-
tration from these groups and restricted territorial licenses were necessary in order to maintain 
public order and security.279  
Once again, the Court was somewhat ambiguous regarding the relationship between the ex-
press derogations found in the Treaty and its own case law concerning public interests and the 
general test of justification. It seemed once again as if this question was insignificant next to 
the principle of proportionality.  
Finally, the Court ruled in ASM Brescia SpA that the need for legal certainty can be a valid 
justification280 – another ambiguous statement that can mean many things depending on its 
interpretation.  
4.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter we have established that the Court has to delicately balance national interests 
against the general economic interests of the Union; or in other words the progression and 
cohesion of the European internal market. At times the Court has concluded that national au-
thorities have not been able to justify their objectives. Sometimes the CJEU rules that the pre-
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sented aim itself is justifiable but the steps taken towards that goal are not proportionate.281 
When the Court assesses the national measure and applies the principle of proportionality it is 
willing to take into account the nature of the restriction but also the sensitivity of the sector in 
which the measure was enacted in. 282 This was clearly demonstrated in Josemans and in 
Omega.283  
However, the CJEU’s proportionality approach can also cause inconsistencies and significant 
ambiguity; the worst case scenario is that the principle of legal certainty itself is jeopard-
ized.284 This is the point of view that many people have adopted, who are critical of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. For instance, Hickman writes that the proportionality as a general crite-
rion is ”neither justified nor desirable”.285 He states that there are inherent problems with the 
proportionality test as decoding the applied intensity and degree is burdensome for lawyers 
and public officials. There is a counter-argument that understanding this review would become 
easier over time, because the ever expanding case law would ultimately provide guidance. 
However, Hickman is unwilling to accept this argument. He states that this would still make 
the principle of proportionality too far-reaching.286   
Hickman also argues that the proportionality evaluation is an intrusive test that imposes the 
burden on the public authority to provide satisfactory proof that their conduct is justified.287 
This is obviously in contrast with the traditional concept of judicial review in which the bur-
den lies on the claimant to demonstrate that some wrongdoing has taken place or some deci-
sion is unreasonable.  
I can certainly understand these arguments. It is true that the concept of proportionality, as it 
exists today in CJEU’s case law, seems to have an elastic nature. Even the likes of Paul Craig 
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have commented that it has “been left to commentators to divine the legal test from the courts’ 
reasoning”288 Also there are some questions as to how suitable the test is in various circum-
stances. The Viking decision289 caused significant controversy. It seemed as if the Court was 
expanding its doctrine and imposing its proportionality test on unions when it gave its ruling – 
completely overriding the public and private divide. Lasser raises this issue, stating “the 
[Court] places a tremendous burden on unions, who must now treat the exercise of their fun-
damental rights as secondary to the firm’s fundamental market freedoms”.290 
The debate concerning the merits of proportionality as a test for judicial review will most 
likely continue for the foreseeable future. However, it is time for us to move on and examine 
what the relationship is between the express derogations and the general test of justification as 
it exists in the Court’s case law. We have witnessed that the Court has a habit of applying the 
test - the principle of proportionality - despite what national authorities use as an argument. 
They might invoke Article 52 TFEU directly or explain that overriding reasons relating to the 
public interest are the reason why some restriction or measure has to be adopted. The question 
then arises: What is the difference between the two or is there any difference at all?  
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289 Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779. 
290 Lasser 2014, p.251. 
  
62 
 
5. ARTICLE 52 TFEU AND ORPI: THE THIN RED LINE?  
5.1 Introduction 
We have established one principal thing in the previous chapters. The free movement of ser-
vices is not absolute; the Court has ruled in favour of various categories of national re-
strictions. It has concluded that these can be justified by different sets of standards, when it has 
delicately tried to strike a balance between the protected national interest and cohesion of the 
internal market. But simultaneously the Court is constantly evolving; it defines and changes 
the reasons for which national restrictions may be justified.291 Systemising this inconsistent 
and ambiguous case law can be somewhat burdensome to say the least.  
In this paper we have examined various national measures affecting economic activities. In 
essence, the justifications provided in Article 52 TFEU, public policy and public safety, are 
not the only reasons that may justify restrictions to trade in services. We have also examined 
that national measures can be justified on the basis of ‘overriding reasons in the public inter-
est’; a doctrine the Court itself has introduced to the EU legal framework. That being said, the 
difference between Article 52 TFEU and the ‘public interest’ doctrine is unclear. Further 
complicating the matter; we have examined previously that in the Services Directive 
(2006/123/EC) there seems to be no distinction at all. Article 4 of the Services Directive spe-
cifically states that public policy and public security are part of the ‘overriding reasons relating 
to the public interest’ (ORPI) doctrine.  
It does not help either that these three different abstract institutions – public policy, public 
security and public interest – can often be used as synonyms in everyday language. Also, in 
Black’s Law Dictionary the term public policy is defined as something that the government 
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can use to stop any action that is against the overall public interest.292 Naturally public security 
can also be placed under the umbrella of public interest in formulations such as these.  
Regardless, in this chapter we will finally try to reach some kind of conclusion concerning the 
relationship between Article 52 TFEU and the CJEU’s public interest doctrine. I will provide 
three propositions as to how one can conceptualize the divide or lack thereof. This is by no 
means an exhaustive list as legal scholars are constantly analysing the case law and finding 
new ways to describe the overall structure behind the Court’s decisions.     
However, let us remind ourselves of what we have learned previously before going through 
the different hypotheses. As we have examined before, the free movement of services entails 
that any direct discrimination on the basis of nationality or place of establishment is prohibit-
ed. Discrimination is also strictly forbidden in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union. In chapter two we established that the Court has interpreted Article 56 
TFEU comprehensively. Member States are to eliminate restrictions that are directly discrim-
inatory, but also all regulations or measures that are non-discriminatory if they impend the 
access or exercise of the free movement (market access).293 
The Treaty formulates that distinctly applicable measures can only be adopted if their exist-
ence can be justified on the basis of one of the reasons laid out in Article 52. The Court has 
repeatedly stated that the public policy or security derogations can only be invoked in specific 
circumstances.294  
In chapter four we identified the general public interest justifications developed by the Court. 
In Gebhard, the European Court of Justice clearly stated that the justification test contains four 
specific conditions. The measure has to be non-discriminatory, it has to be suitable for secur-
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ing the stated objective and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this goal.295 We 
will witness that it is in fact the issue of discrimination that lies at the centre of the ambiguity.  
5.2 The Relationship between Article 52 and the Justification Test 
5.2.1 Article 52 TFEU and ORPI: Separate Entities? 
At the moment, the conventional understanding is that the Treaty derogations and the CJEU’s 
case law are separate entities not to be confused with one another. The argument here is as 
follows: Since the express derogations were left untouched when the Treaty of Lisbon was 
ratified, we should not assume that the legal reality has shifted either. Because public policy 
and security are specifically mentioned in Article 52 TFEU, they are more eminent as deroga-
tions than the public interest justifications developed by the Court. 296    
There is no doubt that the overall consensus is that Article 52 TFEU is available in respect of 
any breach of Union law. In essence, this means that the Member States can adopt 
non-discriminatory measures, but also distinctly applicable restrictions, when there is a suffi-
ciently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.297 This is not the 
presumption when we examine the ‘overriding reasons in the public interest’. The argument is 
that, even if there is considerable overlap with the terms public interest, public policy and pub-
lic security, the test is only applicable when national authorities have adopted 
non-discriminatory or indistinctly applicable restrictions. The European Court of Justice em-
phasized this in Gebhard298, and has underlined it several times in its subsequent case law. For 
instance, in Digibet the Court concluded that such national measures must be in compliance 
with the standard of non-discrimination and proportionality as they are laid down in the case 
law.299 Similarly in Pfleger the Court concluded that Member States must satisfy the relevant 
conditions of non-discrimination (while reiterating also the other parts of the 
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Gebhard-formula; suitability, necessity and the concept of proportionality).300 Likewise, in 
Blanco the CJEU unequivocally stated that ‘a discriminatory restriction is compatible with EU 
law only if it falls under an express derogation, such as Article 52 TFEU’.301  
If we are to take these statements at face value, then the following theory is plausible: The 
Treaty provisions for the free movement of services prohibit some national measures; these 
can only be justified on the basis of Article 52 TFEU. However, other national measures are 
classified as restrictions per se only if the public authority fails to provide satisfactory justifi-
cation for their existence – consistent with the principle of proportionality and the 
Gebhard-formula.302 In other words, ORPI functions as a qualification tool that the CJEU can 
use to determine whether the label ‘restriction’ should be given to a specific national meas-
ure.303 
On the other hand, both Article 52 TFEU and ORPI are subject to the principle of proportion-
ality, and the Court seems to treat them somewhat similarly as exceptions, so it might be more 
appropriate to categorize both of them as exception criteria.  
In any event, according to this approach, there is no overlap between Article 52 and ORPI. We 
are to understand that the express derogations are used only in rare circumstances, while the 
justification test offers a broader tool for analysing restrictive national measures.  
5.2.2 Article 52 TFEU and ORPI: Symbiosis? 
The problem with the previous construction becomes evident if we examine the Court’s case 
law in detail. The Court has been willing to apply its justification test (ORPI) in situations 
where distinctly applicable measures have been adopted by public authorities, or the Court has 
not properly defined the restrictive nature of the measure. In essence, the Court has blurred the 
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line between the two sets of justifications.304 The situation is somewhat similar if we examine 
the argument that ‘purely economic considerations cannot qualify as valid justifications’. At 
times the Court has simply ignored the economic nature of the objective behind the national 
measure.305  
Therefore, the existence of ambiguity in the case law cannot be denied. In addition, it seems 
that there is some inconsistency concerning the use of the terms distinct, indistinct and 
non-discriminatory. When the Court uses the term ‘non-discriminatory’ in its case law 
(Gebhard-formula), this seems to refer to national measures that, while not directly discrimi-
natory, make it more difficult for foreign service providers to properly exercise their rights in 
the territory of a Member State.306 But if the Court is willing to consider distinctly applicable 
measures when it applies its justification test, while also emphasising that this is only possible 
when express derogations are invoked307, then how are we to systematize Article 52 and OR-
PI? Should we view them as [a,] separate institutions, [b.] just accept that there is some ambi-
guity in the case law or [c.] perhaps there is in fact a symbiosis of some sort between the two?     
Considering the above, the following thought experiment is possible: [a.] There is a sliding 
scale within the concept of ‘distinctly applicable measures’ or [b.] the principle of proportion-
ality is applicable to all national measures and no clear borderline exists between Article 52 
and ORPI.  
The first possibility means that the Court is willing to consider discriminatory measures out-
side the express derogations in specific circumstances. This is how Hatzopoulos describes the 
current reality.308 The problem is that the Court has not acknowledged the existence of this 
possibility in its case law. It has never explicitly embraced the idea that there is a wide defini-
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tion of indirect discrimination or some overlap between the terms distinct and indistinct. And 
there are too many unanswered questions if we accept this premise. How do we define the 
scope of distinctly applicable measures that can be justified without invoking the express der-
ogations? On the basis of residence, as the case law suggests, depending on other unknown 
variables?   
There is also the option that we, in fact, make no outright distinction between the concept of 
public policy and security, as they exist in Article 52, and the general public interest criteria 
developed by the Court. In essence, this would go against the argument that the express dero-
gations are becoming ever narrower, while the justifications recognized by the Court are be-
coming ever broader.309 Instead, there is now a symbiosis between the justification test and the 
express derogations – all the exception criteria form one totality and the Court applies the 
principle of proportionality without any clear distinction. If we accept this rationale, then  
Article 4 of the Services Directive makes sense.   
It is undeniable that the Court applies the principle of proportionality in some manner to all 
restrictions – regardless if the Member States use Article 52 TFEU as a justification or ORPI. 
If we consider that these two exception criteria form one totality, it is then possible to assume 
that there is a sliding scale when the Court applies its two-stage proportionality approach 
(suitability and necessity). In essence, the national authorities are left with a considerable mar-
gin of discretion, regarding the discriminatory nature of the national measure, when the meas-
ure protects some fundamental value - as was the case with human dignity in Omega.310 On 
the other hand, the burden of proof on the public authority is much higher in other instances. 
One such example might be the protection of cultural policy interests as we saw in Gouda.311   
Essentially, the assumption behind this hypothesis is that the relationship between Article 52 
TFEU and ORPI is of secondary importance; instead the focus lies on finding the correct bal-
ance between the stated objective and adopted regulation on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, 
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the means must be suitable and necessary in order to reach a given end, but it is also important 
to analyse if there are less restrictive alternatives available. This approach is extremely flexible 
as, at the end of the day, everything depends on the Court’s discretion. No doubt, it provides 
much needed elasticity in a continent where the service market is expanding rapidly while the 
regulatory framework struggles to keep pace. On the other hand, this outcome is not practical 
unless we want to completely dismantle the principle of legal certainty.    
5.2.3 The CJEU: Political Ambitions?   
The third option is somewhat controversial. The assumption here is that the current teleologi-
cal approach312 to the principle of proportionality – and the existing legal framework concern-
ing various exceptions – is not primarily about how suitable or necessary the national measure 
itself is; nor is it about preserving individual freedoms from overzealous government regula-
tions or about protecting some important public policy such as human dignity.313 In reality, the 
relationship between Article 52 TFEU and ORPI is irrelevant, because the Court interprets the 
Treaty provisions and establishes new legal doctrines in order to achieve political goals. Those 
critical of the Court tend to argue that safeguarding its own authority, while promoting overall 
European integration is the true objective of the CJEU.  
Essentially, the idea here is that the principle of proportionality and the justification test func-
tion together as a tool that the Court can use to legitimise its decisions. But, simultaneously, 
the Court also takes certain political realities and ambitions into account when trying to strike 
a balance between various national interests and the Treaty provisions. And it is indeed possi-
ble that the Court does not want to risk a repeat of the famous Sheep Meat decision that jeop-
ardized its own authority.314 In this case the French government claimed that it would maintain 
its mutton market organization as banning imports was necessary to protect domestic produc-
ers. The government was adamant that especially the poor regions in France were largely de-
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pendent on sheep rearing and opening up the market would result in serious socioeconomic 
consequences.315 When the Court eventually ruled against France, it started the ‘sheep meat 
war’. France simply refused to comply with the ruling and defied the Court.316 Might this be 
the reason why the CJEU ruled in Grogan that no sufficient economic link existed between the 
students and the abortion service providers? The Court was able to avoid a head-on collision 
with the Irish constitution and ‘the right to life of the unborn’.317  
But if we accept this premise, then we also have to re-examine the nature of the European 
Court of Justice. Is it purely a legal institution or perhaps also a political one? Is the ambiguity 
that we’ve witnessed in its case law a result of some perpetual balancing act that is political by 
nature? This sentiment – that the CJEU is a political animal trying to find a balance, while 
being surrounded by value pluralism (28 Member States with different beliefs and values) - is 
gaining more steam after various controversial decisions that have been intertwined with 
long-lasting social and economic models.318 Especially after Viking and Laval319, there was a 
feeling that the Court failed to balance fundamental rights and economic freedoms properly. 
And there is some validity to this argument; the Court failed to take into account important 
institutional and jurisdictional distinctions within the Member States.320 It is not unconceiva-
ble to think that this was a result of the Court trying too hard to avoid the risk of 
re-fragmentation of the internal market.    
The persistent ambiguity in the Court’s case law concerning discriminatory measures, and the 
inconclusive divide between Article 52 TFEU and ORPI, is not a surprising result if we as-
sume that some decisions are completely political by their nature. As the political landscape 
changes and the Court has to adjust accordingly, on a case-by-case basis, staying consistent is 
nearly impossible.  
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5.3 Conclusion 
In this fifth chapter, three rudimentary hypotheses were presented in order to explain the rela-
tionship between public policy and security, as they exist in Article 52 TFEU, and the doctrine 
of ‘overriding reasons in the public interest’. Finding the guiding thread is difficult since it is 
ultimately the Court that is responsible for defining abstractions such as public policy and 
public interest. And since there is some inconsistency with the use of some words, namely 
distinct and indistinct discrimination, it can be quite burdensome to conclude which exception 
is accepted as justifying a particular restriction.321  
However, there are ways to remove ambiguity from the legal framework. Some have suggest-
ed that higher transparency and clarity could be achieved with the permissibility of dissenting 
opinions. This might open the Court to some healthy self-criticism and also force it to resolve 
its contradictory judgments. It is said, after all, that a working democracy is characterized by 
an open discourse between the Courts and the society.322 In addition, the Court can also help 
by being more specific. For instance, the proportionality test is somewhat abstract but defining 
its substance is not so burdensome when the Court offers guidance as was the case in De Cos-
ter.323 Similar approach should apply to distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures and the 
concept of non-discrimination. Simply using these terms is not enough; the Court should de-
fine them thoroughly. At the moment, scholars have to make educated guesses as to what the 
legal reality is.324 
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6. DISCUSSION  
The economic importance of services is now fully recognized. On 7 February 2013, the Par-
liament adopted a resolution in which it emphasized the importance of the services sector as a 
key area for growth.325 At the moment the Parliament is involved in legislating on innovative 
services like lifesaving in-vehicle emergency eCal.326 However, the multi-faceted nature of 
services makes them exceedingly difficult to regulate. Even though there are now more studies 
of the way services are produced and traded, the market is constantly evolving and keeping 
pace is difficult.327 
Usually, it is the legislature that sets some basic principles and ground rules that are later in-
terpreted by the courts. But in the field of services, in the face of regulatory inertia and market 
pressures, it is the CJEU that has mainly been responsible for implementing the Treaty rules 
on the free provision of services. In the last two decades, a rich case law has been developed 
by the Court. In the five-year period between 1995–1999 the CJEU gave 40 rulings; that is 
less than the 50 cases given during 2010 alone.328 But this activist approach has also provoked 
hostile reactions and cries of excessive judicial activism.   
In this thesis we have examined the extent of the free movement of services; namely its ceil-
ing. National authorities across Europe have persistently tried to argue that in some instances 
there are legitimate reasons to restrict market freedoms. But sometimes the line between vital 
public interests and unjustified protectionist measures can be thin; especially so when re-
strictions are enacted in order to safeguard national markets from excessive disturbances.329  
The main principles behind Article 52 TFEU and the legal doctrine of ‘overriding reasons in 
the public interest’ have been explained in order to help better understand how the free 
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movement of services can be restricted. We’ve also established that there is some ambiguity in 
the CJEU’s case law and that abstractions such as public policy, security, interest and the 
principle of proportionality can be quite burdensome to define. Furthermore, it has been ar-
gued that some inconsistencies, if not outright contradictions, can be found from the legal 
doctrine developed by the European Court of Justice. We cannot be certain if there is consid-
erable overlap between Article 52 TFEU and ORPI or if, in fact, public policy and public se-
curity can be categorized as overriding reasons in the public interest like the Services Di-
rective (2010/13) suggests.  
The overall consensus still is that the express derogations – public policy and public security - 
are only available when there is a ‘genuine, present and a sufficiently serious threat to one of 
the fundamental interests of society’. Simultaneously, the doctrine of ‘overriding reasons in 
the public interest’ cannot be used to justify discriminatory measures.  
Despite some of the ambiguity in the case law, we can be quite certain that the Court follows a 
two-prong test when it establishes whether a national measure can be justified. The Court first 
defines the pursued interest and then examines whether the measure is suitable for its purpose 
and fulfils the expectation of proportionality. It does not matter if the restriction is in place to 
protect the inviolability of human dignity or local port safety. The principle of proportionality 
applies in all instances and the ultimate discretion – as to what is proportionate - lies with the 
CJEU. This can be problematic as far as the issue of legal certainty is considered. Even though 
the Court tends to exercise caution when sensitive national values are at stake, like the invio-
lability of human dignity, it can also provide much criticized surprises as was the case in Vi-
king and Laval. 
But we should also remember that the single market was conceived before the arrival of the 
internet age. Today, information and communication technologies are the main drivers of 
growth as new services are constantly emerging and providing opportunities.330 It is the very 
nature of the services market that makes it difficult for the legislature to respond properly. 
Perhaps abstract institutions, such as the principle of proportionality, are needed so that the 
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CJEU can be flexible in its approach. That is not to say that ambiguity or outright contradic-
tions in the case law should be ignored. The Court should be specific as to what the relevance 
between distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures is, and it should always try to provide 
viable alternatives when national measures are ruled to be in breach of the Treaty. An 
all-encompassing written legal structure is an impossibility in the field of services - or in any 
other area of law for that matter. But there is a fine line between flexibility and excessive arbi-
trariness on the part of the judges.  
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